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Under federal copyright law, an author's expression is protected
but his ideas and discoveries are not. Professor Shipley explores the
possibility of expanding copyright to protect the research of nonfiction
authors, but concludes that such an expansion would underminefederal
copyrightpolicy. State-law remedies exist that willprovide such protec-
tion if they are not preempted by federal law. Professor Shipley con-
cludes that most contract claims and some misappropriation claims will
survive preemption and therefore are a means by which nonfiction au-
thors can protect their research.
Facts, news, and historical events are in the public domain' and are not
protectible by copyright. 2 Although facts might be discovered by an author,
they are not original to him and thus are not within the realm of copyright.
3
An author's mode of expressing facts and events in a nonfiction narrative, his-
torical account, news report, or biography is copyrightable;4 his "raw materi-
als," however, are not.5 Similarly, research would not appear to be
copyrightable because the law safeguards only an author's form of expression,
t Associate Professor, The University of South Carolina. B.A. 1972, Oberlin College; J.D.
1975, Chicago.
- Associate, Helms, Mulliss & Johnston; Charlotte, North Carolina. A.B. 1980, Erskine
College; J.D. 1983, The University of South Carolina.
1. It is frequently stated that facts are not copyrightable. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.100
(1984) (No. 83-1870); see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); Marshall v. Yates, 27 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYIoHT J. (BNA) No. 658, at 137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Lake v. CBS, 140 F. Supp.
707,708-09 (S.D. Cal. 1956); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); N. BooRsTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 82 (1981);
A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 32 (5th ed. 1979); Gorman, Copyright Protection/or the Collec-
tion andRepresentation of Facts, 76 HAnv. L. Rav. 1569, 1577 (1963); cf. Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F.
Supp. 45, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (ideas and facts not protectible); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports
Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682, 685 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (data and ideas not protectible).
2. A writing must originate with the author to be protectible. Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d
195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalada Fine Arts, Inc.,
191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C.
1980); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[A] (1983).
3. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 2, at § 1.01[B][2][c].
4. These expressions of fact are protectible even though the term "copyrightable" is not
technically correct. The term, however, often is used. See A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 15-62.
5. Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Gorman, supra note 1, at 1577;
NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEWV
not his labor in searching for and gathering facts. Compelling arguments,
however, can be made on behalf of an author whose research has been appro-
priated,6 and thus the law is not settled on this point.
An author's copyright to a nonfiction narrative gives him exclusive rights
to control reproduction, prepare derivative works, 7 perform the work pub-
licly,8 and authorize and be compensated for a dramatization of his work. Be-
cause the facts underlying his narrative are not copyrightable, however,
another author may be able to appropriate those facts to prepare his own work
without the first author's consent and without any independent research.
Under this scenario the second author has not violated the original copyright
if he does not copy the first author's manner of expression.9 This appropria-
tion, however, may greatly reduce the market for the original author's work.
A variety of theories have developed to protect the efforts of nonfiction
authors. Some theories expand the scope of federal copyright protection;
others are based on common-law doctrines.' 0 Several of the common-law the-
ories appear to conflict directly with settled principles of copyright law, and
thus may be preempted. This Article studies the basis and scope of the rule
that facts are not copyrightable1 ' and reviews and criticizes the theories that
Taylor, The Uncopyrightability of Historical Matter: Protecting Form Over Substance and Fiction
Over Fact, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 33, 35 (1983).
6. Some argue that the labor involved in research is more similar to expression than to the
facts uncovered, and therefore research should be protectible by copyright. N. BOORSTYN, supra
note I, at 81. Similarly, an author's research arguably should be protectible by copyright because
copyright law consistently has protected the labor of those who compile and arrange unprotectible
data into directories, telephone books, and catalogues. See Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d
484 (9th Cir. 1937) (protection of a telephone directory); Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v.
Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.) (collection of trademarks), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581
(1922); Chain Store Business Guide, Inc. v. Wexler, 79 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (directory of
names). See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1982) (definition of "compilation" and scope of rights
therein); 1 M. NImMER, supra note 2, at 3-5 n.8. Historians are at least as deserving of protection
as compilers. Taylor, supra note 5, at 36-56. See infra text accompanying notes 94-136.
See generally Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: 4 Theoryfor the Protection of Non.
fiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516, 516-17 (1981); Hill, Copyright Protection for His.
torical Research: A Defense of the Minority View, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 45, 59, 67
(1984); Gorman, supra note 1, at 1584; Note, Copyright Law and Factual Works-Is Research
Protected4 58 WAsH. L. REv. 619, 622 (1983). See also infra text accompanying notes 71-191.
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(l)(2) (1982). See also id. §§ 101, 103 (definition of "derivative work"
and scope of rights therein).
8. Id. § 106(4).
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (research
not copyrightable); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.) (historicalinterpretation not protected by copyright), cert. deniea 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Suid v. Newsweek
Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980) (defendant's use ofplantifs book as source of quotes
from unpublished letters did not violate copyright laws). But see Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co.,181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950) (plaintiff's substantial research and translation protected); Leon v.
Pacific TeL & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (telephone directory subject to copyright). See
also 1 M. NIMtMER, spranote 2, § 2.1 l[E], at 2-164 to -165; Gorman, supra note 1, at 1583; Taylor,
supra note 5, at 37.
10. Some of the possible common-law bases for protection are unfair competition and misap-propriation, express contract, implied contract, contract, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, con-version, a d tortious interference with contract. See generally Gorman, supra note 1, at 1571,1584; Denicola, supra note 6, at 517-18 n.7.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 14-70.
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have been used to extend copyright protection to research.12 The Article con-
cludes by examining the limited protection for research under the common-
law theories that survive federal preemption.
1 3
I. FACTS AND COPYRIGHTABILITY
The Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors. . .the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings .... "14 Pursuant to this authorization
the copyright statutes provide that "protection subsists. . . in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. . . from which
they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated . .. " 15 Ac-
cordingly, protectible subject matter encompasses not only literary works16 but
also "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative or aesthetic labor."' 7 An
author is the one "to whom anything owes its origin .... ",18 He must create
his work independently, without copying. Although some minimal level of
creative labor is required for a work to be protected, the fundamental require-
ment is originality-independent creation. 19 Therefore, facts are not subject
to copyright protection.
[A] fact does not originate with the author of a book describing the
fact. Neither does it originate with the one who "discovers" the fact.
"The discoverer merely finds and records. He may not claim that the
facts are 'original' with him, although there may be originality and
hence authorship in the manner of reporting, i.e., the 'expression' of
the facts."
'20
Courts have denied copyright protection to facts in histories, biographies,
news accounts, and other nonfiction works.21 Section 102(b) of the Copyright
12. See infra text accompanying notes 71-191.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 192-400.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
16. A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 18.
17. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954) (statuettes used as lamp bases are protectible by copyright); Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photograph may be protectible subject matter); Williams Elec-
tronics v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870, 873-77 (3d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's computer program and audio-
visual works-video games-entitled to copyright protection); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (operating system software protectible).
18. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
19. "Original" means that a work owes its origin to the author. Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 20-21. In a
novel the author's ideas, arrangement, and final expression originate with him. His ideas can be
used freely but his mode of expression is subject to copyright protection. Gorman, supra note 1, at
1570. In contrast, the facts and sequences of events expressed by journalists, historians, and biog-
raphers are in the public domain and are not protectible by copyright. The author's efforts in
gathering those facts-his research-are tedious and costly but the data is not protected because it
does not originate with the author. Id. at 1570, 1577. Only his expression is subject to copyright
protection.
20. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.03[E]); see Taylor, supra note 5, at 35.
21. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.1lI[B], at 2-157; Gorman, supra note 1, at 1583. Factual
works include maps, news and historical accounts, directories, legal and business forms, and re-
1984]
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Act codifies these results, stating that "[iln no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process...
or discovery .... *22 If an author could claim exclusive rights to an actual
event by being the first to narrate and copyright a story, he could prevent
others from preparing different accounts of that event. 23 This power would
contravene the fundamental purpose of copyright: to encourage production of
works of authorship to "advance public welfare through the talents of authors
. . . in 'Science and useful Arts.' "24 "[T]he cause of knowledge is best served
when history is the common property of all, and each generation remains free
to draw upon the discoveries and insights of the past."'25 Furthermore, the first
amendment mandates free use of historical and biographical facts and news
events;26 copyright was not intended to prevent the free communication of
ideas, information, and facts.27 Reward to the copyright owner is only a sec-
ondary consideration.
28
Incentives for creative labor exist, despite the lack of copyright protection
for facts. A copyright grants an author enforceable exclusive rights to the lit-
erary form.in which ideas and facts are arranged and expressed. 29 An author
is rewarded financially for his creative expression and the public benefits from
the steady production and dissemination of works of authorship 30 and the free
use of facts and ideas. Thus, two competing policies are balanced through
copyright protection.3' As one court explained: "[I]f the protectible scope of
lated works when the author's materials are objective data that he organizes, selects, arranges, and
expresses in an intelligible manner. Gorman, supra note 1, at 1569.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Facts are in the public domain and therefore cannot be copy-
righted. E.g., Georgia v. The Harrison Co., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 119, 122 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (stat-
utes not copyrightable); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,
202 n.7 (2d Cir. 1983) ("discovery" in § 102(b) interpreted to encompass facts), cert. granted, 104
S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
23. Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632, 638 (S.D. Cal. 1935); see
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
24. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975); cf. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation and Preemption: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 509, 510.
25. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp.
45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
26. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), re 'g 557
F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (TheNations use of President Ford's memoirs not an infringement
of copyright), cert granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); cf. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc. v. General Signal, 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (manufacturer's use of
favorable product evaluation in advertising not an infringement; consumer information protected
under the first amendment), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984) (No. 83-1870); see also I M. NIM-
miER, supra note 2, § 2.1l[E], at 2-167.
27. Congress' intent was to ensure such free communication. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 56-57 (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REp.]. See also Leibovitz v. CBS, 213
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 289-90 (D. Mass. 1981); Gorman, supra note 1, at 1579.
28. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 131, 136 (1973); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 138 (1948); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-
44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Abrams, supra note 24, at 510.
29. H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 56; Taylor, supra note 5, at 37.
30. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
31. Conflicts between the interests of creators and users (readers, the public, and later au-
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an author's writings is too narrowly defined he will be discouraged from fur-
ther writing. If, however, the protectible scope of the original author's work is
too broadly defined, creative work by others will be discouraged. ' 32 Copy-
right law accommodates these competing interests by protecting an author's
expression, but not the underlying facts that he expresses.
33
II. THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
NONFICTION LITERARY WORKS
Copyright encompasses a bundle of exclusive rights34 that the author may
exercise or authorize others to exercise, in whole or in part, by license, transfer,
assignment, or other means of conveyance. 35 The author has the fundamental
right to control reproduction and prevent others from copying the protected
elements of the creation 36-- the arrangement, combination, and expression of
ideas and facts.37 The author's rights are limited because "fa]bsent copying
thors) are inherent in copyright and the law of intellectual property. See generally Baird, Common
Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U.
CHi. L. REV. 411, 415 (1983); Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF.
L. REV. 873, 875-80 (1971); Gorman, supra note 1, at 1582. The Constitution authorizes exclusive
rights only for "limited Times." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Copyright law grants exclusive
rights, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982), and then subjects them to several specific limitations. Id. §§ 110-18.
This tension also is evident in the fair-use doctrine, as codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), and in
the many cases in which courts have tried to balance public interests against the copyright owner's
right. See, e.g, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984); Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984) (No. 83-1632); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
32. Morrison v. Solomons, 494 F. Supp. 218, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
33. Because the primary objective of copyright is to serve the public interest, it usually will
prevail over an author's interests when there is a conflict. See United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp.
726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see also Denicola, supra note 6, at 519; cf. Abrams, supra note 24, at 5 10.
The public interest in the free use of facts and information is served by denying protection to such
matters. Denicola, supra note 6, at 525; Gorman, supra note 1, at 1582-83. On the other hand, the
public interest in encouraging nonfiction works is accommodated by protecting an author's man-
ner of expression. 1 M. NIMMER supra note 2, § 2.11 [B], at 2-158 to -159; Gorman, supra note 1, at
1579; Taylor, supra note 5, at 36-39. Thus, even though the chronological arrangement of facts is
not original and therefore not protectible, see infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text, the au-
thor's manner of expressing the facts and chronology is protectible by copyright. Nevertheless, all
are free to use the facts in a nonfiction work. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d
1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91,
95 (2d Cir. 1977); Ricker v. General Elec. Co., 162 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1947); Suid v. News-
week Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D.D.C. 1980); Mosley v. Follett, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1109, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Rokeach v.
Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155, 160-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Norman v. CBS,
333 F. Supp. 788, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921,
923 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Consumers Union v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 199 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see also I M. NIMMER, supra note
2, § 2.11[A]; Denicola, supra note 6, at 535; Gorman, supra note 1, at 1583.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
35. Id. § 201(d).
36. Id. § 106(l). Denicola, supra note 5, at 522.
37. Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921, 923 (S.D. Cal. 1963). See Ei-
senschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957).
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there can be no infringement of copyright, '38 and even when copying is
demonstrated 39 the author must prove substantial similarity of copyrightable
expression. 40 Accordingly, copyright is infringed by the substantial appropria-
tion of the author's "'particular expression through similarities of treatment,
details, scenes, events and characterization.' "41 Infringement may result from
"imitation, paraphrasing, or colorable alteration" as well as literal copying.
42
The author also has authority over the preparation of works derived from
his protected work,43 such as the adapation of a book to a movie.4 This right
is similar to the reproduction right,45 and it allows an author to control how
his work is recast and transformed in a different medium.46 Thus, a movie
studio that adapted a book to a movie without authorization could be liable
38. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). Rights are not infringed by the independent
creation of a similar work. Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 275 (2d Cir.
1936); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
39. Copying must be established. In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiff may be able
to establish a strong inference of copying by showing that the defendant had access to the first
work and that similarities exist between the works. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir.
1946). Similarities that exist only because both works deal with the same historical material can-
not provide the basis for an infringement claim. Marshall v. Yates, 27 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 137, 137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (author of book about Frances Farmer unable to
establish that the movie "Frances" infringed). The plaintiff must prove bopying of some pro-
tectible element. Id. at 138.
40. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cerl. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931). Striking similarities between two works may create a presumption of copying, see
infra text accompanying notes 351-55, but whether or not such similarities establish a substantial
and material taking that constitutes infringement is a different question. A. LATMAN, supra note 1,
at 161. The alleged infringer may have copied the author's expressions, but this copying will not
constitute infringement unless the taking is substantial. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld,
511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. 702, 711 (S.D. Fl.
1982).
41. Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977) (quot-
ing Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976)).
42. A. LATMAN, supra note I, at 165. See also Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n,
275 F. 797 (7th Cir. 1921) (Chicago Heraldinfringed New York Tribune's news story describing
German submarines). That the copying was unintentional is not a defense. A. LATMAN, supra
note 1, at 160. Facts discovered and expressed by a diligent historian, however, may be appropri-
ated freely if the historian author's particular form of expression is not used. Gorman, supra note
1, at 1583. See generally Taylor, supra note 5, at 36-39.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
44. Id § 101 ("derivative work" defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a ... dramatization, fictionalization, or motion picture version. ... ). Deriva-
tive works, whether prepared by the owner of the underlying work or with his consent or based on
a work in the public domain, are copyrightable subject matter. Id § 103(a). The copyright, how-
ever, is separate from, and does not affect, the copyright on the underlying work. Id § 103(b),
Only those elements that are original to the derivative work-materials contributed by the work's
author-are entitled to protection. Id
45. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.09[A], at 8-110.1 to -110.2. This right arguably is super-
fluous because an adaptation "reproduces" the underlying work. Nevertheless, an adaptation
right was recognized explicitly in § 1(b) of the 1909 Act as a right to make any other version of the
copyrighted work; § 7 provided that such works were entitled to copyright protection. Act of Mar.
4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1, 7, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976).
46. This right may result in substantial financial rewards for the copyright owner. A writer
could authorize the publication of a condensed version of his novel in Reader's Digest, the prepa-
ration and performance of a play, and then grant motion picture rights to a major studio. 411he
President's Men was very successful as both a book and a movie, as was Gone With the Wind But
see Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. deniea 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
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for violating the right to prepare derivative works,47 as well as the right of
reproduction and the right to control performances.
48
The Act's definition of "derivitive work" is broad; it includes "any...
form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted. '49 Notwith-
standing this sweeping definition, to infringe this right a work must incorpo-
rate a substantial amount of the underlying work's protected expression.50 A
movie about a historic figure is not derivative of the leading biography about
that figure absent substantial similarity of protected expression.51 Thus, the
Act's basic limitations on the reproduction right similarly restrict the scope of
the right to prepare derivative works.52
Fictional elements that an author might include in his otherwise factual
or historical work also are protectible;53 "the fictionalizing of events and inci-
dents in the life of an historic figure is the author's original treatment of the
life of such figure and is subject to protection against appropriation by
others."'54 Thus, one who uses materials in a factual work risks copying the
47. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (copyrights to the book and film Gone With the Wind infringed by
three-act play with music entitled Scarlett Fever). But see Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (infringement by film maker not upheld, despite sufficient evidence,
because jury improperly instructed that plaintiff's research was copyrightable.).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4) (1982); 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.09[A]. If the right to
prepare derivative works has been infringed, a violation of either the reproduction or the perform-
ance right necessarily has occurred. Absent substantial similarity of copyrightable expression be-
tween the underlying work and the adaptation allegedly constituting a violation of the
reproduction right, however, the adaptation will not be deemed derivative so as to infringe 17
U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). See also infra note 51.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See also A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 174-75. The definition also
includes illustrative examples. See id.
50. H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 62; S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1976); A.
LATMAN, supra note 1, at 175; Minms, Reversion and Derivative Works Under the Copyright Acts
of 1909 and 1976, 28 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 10 (1982) ("[A] work will be considered a
derivative work only if it would be an infringing work but for the consent of the copyright owner
of the underlying work.").
51. Similarity of subject matter and unprotectible facts is not enough. See, e.g., Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.) (hypothesis of Hindenburg sabotage not copy-
rightable), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598
(7th Cir. 1957) (historical details), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Marshall v. Yates, 27 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 137, 137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (biography); Klekas v. EMI
Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 198 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1984) (unpublished novel not infringed by
movie and novel The Deer Hunter primarily because the similarities dealt with subjects that were
not independently copyrightable); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (screen-
play not infringed by motion picture "Stir Crazy" because thematic similarities dealt with un-
copyrightable matters). Determining whether an adaptation infringes another's copyright is not
easy unless it is a very close reproduction. The transformations often may be so great that it is
difficult to see any connection between the works. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEw OF
COPYRIGHT 56-57 (1967).
52. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.09[A]; see also supra notes 48, 50.
53. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[C], at 2-161; Taylor, supra note 5, at 42-47.
54. Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see De Acosta v. Brown, 146
F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied sub nora. Hearst Magazines v. De Acosta, 325 U.S. 862
(1945). In response to plaintiff's claim that he infringed her biography of Clara Barton by copying
its fictional elements, defendant in De Acosta argued that the material dealt with the life of a
public character and therefore was in the public domain. The court rejected defendant's argu-
ment, holding that "original treatment of the life of a historic character, like such treatment of any
material even in the public domain, is entitled to protection against appropriation by others." De
Acosta, 146 F.2d at 410; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.1 l[C].
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fictional elements added by the original author.55 An estoppel analysis, how-
ever, lessens this danger:56 "[E]quity and good morals will not permit one who
asserts something as a fact. . . to change that position for profit in a law suit"
and argue that the material copied from his work was fictional.57 In Davies v.
Bowes,58 a newpaper correspondent wrote an article about a courtroom situa-
tion and claimed that it was a "real life drama." A playwright then used the
story's facts in a play and the correspondent sued for infringement. The court
denied protection for plaintiff's work and held that "it is a matter of morals
that he who puts forth a thing as verity shall not be heard to allege for profit
that it is fiction."59 It is common, however, for biographers and historians to
fictionalize their works to some degree to convey the style of a period or the
personality of a subject. As a result, some courts may not regard such a histor-
ical work as entirely factual absent an express representation. 60 Thus, the
plaintiff would not be estopped from protecting fictional elements of the work.
In some situations the nonfiction author's sequence or arrangement of
facts may not be protectible when that particular presentation is prescribed by
the actual events.6 1 An account that traces a series of events in chronological
order is not an original arrangement:
[N]ot only are all the facts recorded in a history in the public domain,
but, since the narration of history must proceed chronologically,-or
55. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[C], at 2-161.
56. See, e.g., Marshall v. Yates, 27 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 137, 137-38
(C.D. Cal. 1983); Mosley v. Follett, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1109, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Huie v.
NBC, 184 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Oliver v. St. Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal.
1941); Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[C].
57. Oliver v. St. Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296, 299 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
58. 209 F. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
59. Id at 55; see Mosley v. Follett, 209 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 1109, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Huie v.
NBC, 184 F.Supp. 198, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Marshall v. Yates, 27 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 137, 137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1983); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11 [C], at 2-161 to
-162; Gorman, supra note 1, at 1577-78. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General
Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984) (No. 83-1870),
illustrates a variation on this estoppel concept. The court concluded that plaintiff could not com-
plain about defendant's accurate advertising use of a favorable product rating and evaluation
published in Consumers Union's Consumer Reports in part because plaintiff held out its testing
and evaluation process as objective, intending consumers to rely on its ratings. The court viewed
Consumer Reports as an informational magazine; defendant reported "facts." Therefore, defend-
ant's copying was a fair use. Id at 1048-5 1. For a more detailed description of the case, see infra
note 186.
60. The courts' reluctance to label some historical works as entirely factual lessens the impact
of the estoppel defense. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.1 1[C], at 2-162 (discussing the uncer-
tainty of the estoppel's operation with cases involving books about Clara Barton and Wyatt Earp),
Compare De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denledsub nom. Hearst Magazines
v. De Acosta, 325 U.S. 862 (1945) with Lake v. CBS, 140 F. Supp 707 (S.D. Cal. 1956). Historical
facts contained in fictional as well as nonfictional works, however, may be repeated without liabil-
ity for infringement. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir.)
(no infringement because the similarities were only of historical material not subject to copyright
protection), cert. denie, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's book on Vietnam War's effects on women,
injured veterans, and soldiers not infringed by movie Coming Home because general theme was
not protected and all other similarities related to facts, ideas, and sequences that were not pro-
tectible); Mosley v. Follett, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1109, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
61. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.1 lIB], at 2-159; see Gorman, supra note 1, at 1578; Tay-
lor, supra note 5, at 39-41.
[Vol. 63
COPYRIGHT LAW
at least, such is the convention-the order in which the facts are re-
ported must be the same in the case of a second supposed author.
62
Several courts also have held that copyright does not protect an author's
historical interpretation or theories even though they were original to him.
63
In Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.64 plaintiff wrote a ful-length book
about the destruction of the Hindenburg, incorporating his theory about who
was responsible for the disaster. He later sued Universal and another author,
alleging that they copied his theory. The court held that "where, as here, the
idea at issue is an interpretation of an historical event, . . . such interpreta-
tions are not copyrightable as a matter of law." 65 The court concluded that
historical theories, like ideas, must be left in the public domain so that subse-
quent authors are free to write about the event.
66
Although copyright affords some protection to a nonfiction author, it is
limited considerably by the rule that facts are not copyrightable. Authors are
free to use earlier works;67 and, "'absent wholesale usurpation of another's
expression, claims of copyright infringement where works of history are at
62. "There cannot be any such thing as copyright in the order of presentation of the facts,
nor, indeed, in their selection, although into that selection may go the highest genius of author-
ship, for indeed, history depends wholly upon a selection from the undifferentiated mass of re-
corded facts." Myers v. Mail & Express Co., 36 Copy. Dec. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), quoted in
Norman v. CBS, 333 F. Supp. 788, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774,
777 (C.D.Cal. 1981), aff'd, 598 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982); Morrison v. Solomons, 494 F. Supp. 218,
225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). A similar rationale has been used to deny protection to an author's style
of writing. Plaintiff in Ricker v. General Electric Co., 162 F.2d 141 (2d. Cir. 1947), had written
two books explaining the fundamentals of radio communications. She used a simple, readily un-
derstood writing style that defendant allegedly had copied. The court stated that an author does
not have "a monopoly of the idea of expounding ... information in simple language comprehen-
sible by lay readers," id at 142, and held that defendant was not liable for infringement for using a
style of writing similar to plaintiff's style. See also McMahon v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp.
1296, 1302 (E.D. Mo. 1980). If the subject matter dictates that facts be expressed in a certain way,
that manner of expression cannot be protected. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11 [B], at 2-159 &
n.10..
63. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980) ; Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Gorman, supra note 1,
at 1582-83.
64. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
65. Id. at 978. See Wainwright Sec. Inc., v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1977), in which the court stated that "[wihat is protected is the manner of expression, the author's
analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals facts, his
choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular developments." Id. at 95-96. This state-
ment that an author's interpretation is protected seems to contradict statements in Hoehling.
Wainwright's facts differed from Hoehling's, however, suggesting that there is no inconsistency
between the cases. Defendant in Wainwright appropriated plaintiff's analytical reports on major
corporations and included the "most creative and original aspects of the reports" verbatim in its
own publication. Id. at 96. The court stressed that defendant repeatedly used not only plaintiff's
theories and research, but also its expression. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 207 n.19 (2d Cir. 1983) (distingushing Wainwright), cert. granted 104 S. Ct.
2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
66. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978 ("[tlo avoid a chilling effect").
67. Id. ("broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors"). See, e.g., Landsberg v.
Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (for infringement of factual
works, "similarity of language may have to amount to verbatim reproduction or very close para-
phrasing"); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 907 (1957); Lake v. CBS, 140 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Cal. 1956); Caruthers v. RKO Radio Pic-
tures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Maddux v. Grey, 43 F.2d 441 (S.D. Cal. 1930);
Gorman, supra note 1, at 1583.
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issue are rarely successful.' ",68 If a nonfiction author cannot show verbatim
reproduction or close paraphrasing of his form of expression, 69 he will be un-
able to protect his research unless the court recognizes an extension of copy-
right theory or a common-law claim.
70
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR THE PRODUCT OF RESEARCH
A. The Toksvig Rule
Plaintiff in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co.71 wrote a biography about
Hans Christian Andersen. Her research spanned three years and was derived
exclusively from Danish sources, including Andersen's original works and let-
ters. Defendant subsequently wrote a book based on Andersen's life after less
than a year of researching English sources, including plaintiff's biography.
The court concluded that defendant had copied twenty-four specific passages,
as well as certain general concepts about Andersen, his life, and his friends,
that had first appeared in plaintiff's book. Defendant argued that these mater-
ials were in the public domain, that she could have secured the same informa-
tion from other works, and that this was a fair use of plaintiff's work.72 The
court stated that, in determining whether defendant infringed plaintiff's
copyright:
[t]he question is not whether [defendant] could have obtained the
same information by going to the same sources, but rather did she go
to the same sources and do her own independent research? In other
words, the test is whether the one charged with the infringement has
made an independent production, or made a substantial and unfair
use of the complainant's work.73
The record established that defendant had not reviewed the original sources
and that her use of plaintiff's work had enabled her to complete her book in
less than one-third the time; accordingly, the court held that defendent had
infringed plaintiff's copyright. 74 Although this result could be justified be-
68. Mosley v. Follett, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1109, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Hoehlng
618 F.2d at 974); see Taylor, supra note 5, at 34 ("historians and biographers ... have received
scant judicial support in their attempts to protect their work product from exploitation"),
69. "A verbatim reproduction or close paraphrasing of even a historical or factual work con-
stitutes copyright infringement." Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C.
1980); accordLandsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.
1984).
70. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981), rek' 460
F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (research not copyrightable; otherwise proper jury instruction stating
that research was copyrightable held reversible error); infra text accompanying notes 71-136; see
also Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
71. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
72. Id at 666-67.
73. Id at 667.
74. Id; see Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951) (plaintiff denied
recovery against newspaper that concededly copied his map because copyright on map was invalid
because plaintiff had prepared it from several existing maps rather than doing any surveying); see
also Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 602-03 (7th Cir.) (no infringement
occurred because defendant had done substantial independent research and similarities between
his work and plaintiff's work were insufficient), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
[Vol. 63
COP YIGHT L4W
cause of defendant's substantial close copying of twenty-four passages, some
translated from Danish sources, the holding is much broader: plaintiff biogra-
pher had a protectible interest in her research.
75
Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp.76 applied Toksvi, holding that de-
fendants infringed plaintiff's historical biography by using it almost exclu-
sively as the source for an article.77 Plaintiff had done a considerable amount
of research; defendant spent only three days researching his work and a fourth
day writing.78 It was clear from defendant's exclusive reliance on the earlier
work as source material, the short amount of time he spent in research and
writing, and the numerous similarities between the two works that defendant
had done no independent research. As in Toksvig, infringement could have
been based on substantial paraphrasing and verbatim copying.79 The court,
however, relied on Toksvig and extended copyright protection to the factual
product of the research. Thus, under Toksvig and Holdredge a second author
must do independent research to avoid relying on the facts uncovered by an-
other's research.80
The protection afforded by the Toksvig rule, however, is not absolute.
First, if the alleged infringer conducted independent research, infringement
cannot be based on factual similarities between his work and an earlier one.
8 '
Second, an author can use a copyrighted work to find sources, if he then uses
those sources.82 Last, under the fair-use doctrine, one may "use the copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner without [the owner's] consent." 83
75. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, §2.11[E], at 2-165 to -166 &n.35; Gorman, supra note 1, at
1583-84; Hill, supra note 6, at 46-48; Taylor, supra note 5, at 47-50. The holding also rested in part
on the protection copyright affords to translations. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1982) (definition and
protection of "derivative works"). Although the court correctly stated that public domain materi-
als cannot be protected by copyright, and found evidence that plaintiff was the author of the
specific passages in question, Tokswig, 181 F.2d at 666, it went too far by implying that the copy-
right of a translation of a public domain work would extend to the underlying work. Because the
translator is not the author of the underlying work, there is no originality in his work, except for
that which is evidenced by the translation itself. Section 103(b) establishes that the translator's
copyright to his derivative work does not establish any rights to the preexisting material he trans-
lated. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
76. 214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
77. Defendant author admitted that he did no original research, that one of plaintiff's books
was the source of much of his article, and that his only other research consisted of skimming two
books. Id. at 923.
78. Id at 922-23. The introduction and bibliographies of both of plaintiff's books demon-
strated the extent of her research and the available sources; she claimed to have worked eight or
nine years on the books. Id.
79. Id at 923-24. Defendant copied plaintiff's form of expression.
80. Gorman, supra note 1, at 1584 (critical of results); see Taylor, supra note 5, at 52-53.
Some language in the Toksvig opinion indicated that if defendant relied solely on plaintiff's non-
fiction book in writing his article, an infringement could be found even if defendant had avoided
using plaintiff's form of expression and had used only the facts. See also Triangle Publications,
Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942) (conversion of
facts into sentence form prohibited by copyright); B. KAPLAN, supra note 51, at 62.
81. Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598, 602-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 355
U.S. 907 (1957); Toksvig, 181 F.2d at 667; see Taylor, supra note 5, at 49.
82. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956). See I M. NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 2.1l[E], at 2-168 (plaintiff's work can be used for leads and clues).
83. Toksvig, 181 F.2d at 666 (citing H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROP-
ERTY § 125, at 260 (1944)); Denicola, supra note 6, at 524; cf. Hill, supra note 6, at 48-49. The
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Generally, however, Toksvig requires independent research by a subsequent
author. Even though this may require some duplicative efforts, 84 several argu-
ments favor such an extension of copyright to protect an author's research.
B. Arguments Supporting Toksvig
1. The Fruits of Independent Labors
A nonfiction author should have to do his own research and abstracting,
so that his work will be original and valuable to society.85 The first author's
efforts are rewarded by copyright protection, and the public may benefit from
doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The activities the doctrine permits include "quota-
tion of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment; quotation of short
passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarification of the author's observa-
tions; [and]. . . summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. ... I
H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 65. Section 107 enumerates various characteristics for the court to
examine before determining whether a particular use is fair: "(1) the purpose and character of the
use.. .; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
84. Note that copyright law, to prevent such duplicative effort, does not protect ideas and
facts. Gorman, supra note 1, at 1582-84. Professor Nimmer argues that the first amendment may
limit Tksvig: "[w]hile freedom of speech generally is not impermissibly] abridged by copyright
protection for 'expression,' to grant a copyright monopoly to facts as such would constitute an
intolerable limitation on First Amendment rights." I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11 [E], at 2-
167. Contra Hill, supra note 6, at 65 (fair use is adequate to protect the public interest in the free
dissemination of information). In 1982 the United States Court of Appeals for the the Second
Circuit noted that "[n]o Circuit that has considered the question. . . has ever held that the First
Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embod-
ied in the 'fair use' doctrine." Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982). The
court refused to accept CBS's argument that its obituarial use of plaintiff's compilation of high-
lights from Charlie Chaplin's films was protected by a first amendment privilege, In a 1983 deci-
sion, however, the same court acknowledged that the Copyright Act, by protecting expression
rather than facts and ideas, protects authors without impeding the public's access to information
and without abridging freedom of expression. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters.,
723 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). In the work
at issue-an article derived from President Ford's memoirs-the need to construe the concept of
protectibility by copyright in accordance with the first amendment was especially important be-
cause the article described significant factual political events that are not protectible by copyright.
See also Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3236 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1984).
85. Jackson, "Fact Works Copyrightabiliy and Infringement, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 833,
841-46 (1963).
The source of any created work. . . [including fact works]. . . is the changing, infinitely
complex reality of our total environment, unordered and unlimited .... The protection
of copyright requires a subsequent creator to go through a similar process of abstraction
and creation in order to profit from the sale of another work of the same kind during the
life of the original copyright. Society has nothing to lose by this requirement, for only by
independently carrying out another abstracting process can the second author possibly
create a work that is different, and therefore, that is of additional value to society.
Id. at 841-42. See also Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). Simi-
lar arguments have been made with regard to maps. Some courts have required cartographers to
do their own surveying, exploring, and inquiring to create a copyrightable map instead of allowing
a selection and combination of materials from existing maps. See, e.g., Amsterdam v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1951) ("for a map to be copyrightable its preparation
must involve a modicum of creative work"). But see United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448 (9th
Cir. 1978) (direct-observation rule criticized strongly because it goes beyond the level of original-
ity required by copyright law); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.08[A], at 2-79 to -82 (same);
Gorman, supra note 1, at 1571-76 (same).
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another's original treatment of the same subject.86 This approach, however,
requires an inordinately high level of originality from the subsequent author;
the law usually does not demand novelty for a work to be entitled to copyright
protection, but merely requires that the work "'owes its origin'" to the "'au-
thor.' "87 The independent research argument discourages writers from build-
ing on the contributions of earlier authors: 88 "A dwarf standing on the
shoulders of a giant can see further than the giant himself."89
2. Protection from Unfair Competition
In addition to encouraging original works by subsequent authors, the
Toksvig rule also protects the first researcher from unfair competition.90 It
prevents subsequent authors from "reap[ing] where [they have] not sown."91
As it is necessary to reward the effort and ingenuity involved in giv-
ing expression to a fact, it is necessary also, if we are to expect indi-
viduals to labor on [the public's] behalf, to reward the effort and
ingenuity involved in obtaining knowledge of the fact.
...[T]o hold other than [that] research is copyrightable is to
violate the spirit of the copyright law and to provide to those ...
lacking in requisite diligence and ingenuity a license to steal.92
Despite these arguments, it is improper to substitute the amorphous concept of
unfair competition for the standards of copyright protection and infringement
because it can extend the monopoly to public domain materials. Although it
may seem unfair for an author to use a predecessor's research, copyright in-
fringement is not the appropriate cause of action to remedy such use unless the
alleged infringer has copied protected original elements in the first author's
work.
93
86. Eg., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976). One
commentator has argued that the Toicsvig rule ensures that facts are presented accurately, and that
a desire for reasonable accuracy is "of greater public utility than a competing desire to encourage
the indiscriminate wholesale merchandising of [historical accounts and trivia]." Taylor, supra
note 5, at 54.
87. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)). The law requires "'little
more than a prohibition of actual copying." Id. at 103 (quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank
C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)). See supra note 19.
88. f Denicola, supra note 6, at 525. This argument also extends protection to facts in
violation of § 102(b) of the Act.
89. Chafee, Reffections on the Law of Copyright (pt. 1), 45 CoLuM. L. REv. 503, 511 (1945).
90. Cf Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702, 711 (S.D. Fla. 1982) justifying protec-
tion for compilations); 1 M. NimMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16; Gorman, supra note 1, at 1583-
84.
91. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918); Sf. Witt Anderson
Co. v. Baldwin Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82, 89 (6th Cir. 1928) (use of source material in non-
competitive work does not violate copyright).
92. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 988 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
93. 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has repudiated the cases and reasoning that extend copyright to protect an author's
labor. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 n.1l (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
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3. The Compilation Analogy
The strongest argument for extending copyright protection to research is
that the analogous efforts of "authors" who compile data are protected.
94
Copyright protects works that are simply compilations of unprotectible facts
and data, such as directories, catalogues, listings, codes, and indices.95 Be-
cause the historian's work is more creative than the compiler's, the law argua-
bly also should protect the historian at least as fully as the compiler.
96
A compilation is a collection of preexisting materials, which in themselves
may not be protectible by copyright, 97 "that are selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original
work of authorship."9 8 Protection usually is limited to the author's original
contribution and not the preexisting materials.99 When a compiler exercises
judgment in selecting, presenting, or arranging particular uncopyrightable
data, the selection °° and arrangement are protectible by copyright,' 0 ' but the
data itself is not. 102 Thus, the scope of copyright protection for a compilation
of public domain materials is limited.
10 3
94. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[D], at 2-163 to -164; Hill, supra note 6, at 56-58.
95. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "compilation"), 103(a) (copyright law protects compila-
tions) (1982); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.04[B], at 2-40 to -42; Denicola,.supra note 6, at 527.
96. Denicola, supra note 6, at 527-38, 542; Taylor, supra note 5, at 48-49. "Less protection
should be given to a compilation of names in a directory than to a compilation of facts," since the
latter requires "greater originality in selection." I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11 [D], at 2-163;
see also Hill, supra note 6, at 58-59.
97. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.04[B], at 2-41.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "compilation"). See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977); Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of
Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Business Lists, Inc. v Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595 (N.D. IR. 1982); Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702, 711 (S.D.
Fla. 1982).
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
100. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937).
102. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-13 to -14. The data is not original to the author.
103. See Financial Information v. Moody's, 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) T 25,617, at
18,765 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1984). Thus, a compiler's copyright can prohibit only the reproduction
of a substantial amount of his original work, an appropriation of his selection of data, or the
copying of his arrangement. See I M. NiMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16 to -17; c. Continental
Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 705 (2d Cir. 1958); see also National Business Lists, Inc.
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 598-600 (N.D. Ii. 1982); Denicola, supra note
6, at 530-33.
Protection should not extend to the public domain materials in the work. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 102(b), 103(b) (1982); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682, 685-
86 (E.D. Pa. 1976); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16. Two publishers may compile,
arrange, and distribute almanacs with lists, census data, election results, sports information, and
statistics. Because that data is not protectible by copyright, a publisher cannot complain that a
competitor has the same information in its book. Assuming that the data is not interpreted in
either of the almanacs, copyright protects only against the close copying of particular selections or
arrangements. Because many ways exist to arrange the information contained in an almanac, as
well as an almost endless supply of data from which to select, it should not be difficult for a
competitor to avoid infringement. See also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11 fE], at 2-164; cf




a. The 'sweat of the brow" rationale
Some decisions, however, have prevented copying of public domain
materials in a compilationI°4 by extending protection to a compiler's labor in
preparing the work.105 These sweat-of-the-brow decisions recognize that the
value of a compilation is its collection of previously unavailable data.
106
Thus, the compilation process is protected, rather than the arrangement of the
data.10 7 These decisions conclude that protection is necessary as an incentive
for the creation of such works. l08 Because nonfiction authors labor to select
and arrange unprotectible facts, the sweat-of-the-brow rationale also would
seem appropriate for the protection of their research. 10 9 The extension of this
doctrine to nonfiction narratives would require subsequent authors to do in-
dependent research rather than rely on the research efforts of others."10
The sweat-of-the-brow expansion of copyright to protect the labor of the
104. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-14.
105. See, e.g., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1977); Leon v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Manage-
ment Sys., Inc., CoPYRirHT L. REp. (CCH) 25,624 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1983); Marling v. Ellison,
218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702, 711 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (dicta); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 598-99 (N.D. IM. 1982); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 905 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Triangle Publi-
cations, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D. Mass. 1942).
Leon is a leading decision in which plaintiff alleged infringement of its alphabetically arranged
telephone directory. Relying exclusively on plaintiff's directory, defendants had rearranged the
names and telephone numbers in numerical order. Even though defendants did not copy plain-
tiff's protected alphabetical arrangement, the court enjoined the publication and distribution of
the directories, holding that the copying and rearranging of data was infringement. The court
held that defendant's fair-use defense was hot applicable because wholesale copying and publica-
tion of protected material could not be fair use. Leon, 91 F.2d at 486. The best explanation of this
decision is that the court wanted to protect plaintiff's labor in compiling the data. The opinion
failed to consider that names, numbers, and addresses are not protectible by copyright and that
protection extends only to plaintiff's arrangement. Instead, it emphasized that the business of
publishing such a directory involves skill, ingenuity, expense, and original research. Id.; see also
Gorman, supra note 1, at 1572-73, 1584-89 (discussing the sweat-of-the-brow rationale with re-
spect to maps and directories).
106. National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 598
(N.D. Ill. 1982)
107. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(compilation deemed an original work because of the author's labors); see also Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 132, 136 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(effort and selection equals authorship); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys. Inc.,
COPyRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,624, at 18,804-06 (N.D. IlM. Dec. 31, 1983) (plaintiff must show
that its original contributions constitute a sufficient effort to protect compilation); Marling v. Elli-
son, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702, 711 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (dicta).
108. National Business Lists Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 599
(N.D. Ill. 1982)
109. See Denicola, supra note 6, at 529-35. Professor Denicola suggests that the act of aggre-
gating isolated items of information can be authorship and the resulting collection of data a work
of authorship.
110. Applying this doctrine to nonfiction works, a historian's well-researched and copyrighted
account of a World War II battle would be infringed if a subsequent author prepared another
work on that battle without doing independent research. See Huie v. NBC, 184 F. Supp. 198
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). It would not be a sufficient defense to argue that facts cannot be protected and
that no originality exists in a chronological arrangement of facts. Myers v. Mail & Express Co., 36
Copy. Dec. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). This doctrine is similar to the Toksvigrnle. See generaly 1
M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[E], at 2-166; Taylor, spra note 5, at 49.
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compiler (and possibly the researcher) has been criticized sharply."1 ' It re-
quires undue originality from a second author1 12 and gives the compiler a
monopoly in public domain materials. 1 3 Such expansion contradicts the ba-
sic principles of copyright codified in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.' 4
Furthermore, the expanded protection contradicts sections 101 and 103, which
expressly limit protection to the compiler's original selection or arrange-
ment. Is Accordingly, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Fifth Circuits have rejected the sweat-of-the-brow rationale in the context of
nonfiction authors and compilers.' 1 6
Limiting protection to the researcher's original arrangement and selection
arguably undermines the economic incentive to discover and compile public
domain information.' 17 Requiring the second author to retrace his predeces-
sor's steps, however, discourages new works and contravenes copyright's pri-
mary purpose. The copyright on the first author's selection or arrangement
requires a subsequent author to rearrange the data so as to arrange it in his
own manner and, thus, exercise independent judgment." 8 Restricting copy-
Ill. See, e.g., I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, §§ 2.11[E], at 3.04; Gorman, supra note 1, at 1584-
$6. Contra Denicola, supra note 6, at 540-41 (first amendment right of free speech generally not
infringed by copyrighting collections of facts in nonfiction works).
112. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16. The person who discovers facts has per-
formed an important task, but his labor is not authorship.
113. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Section 102(b) provides: "In no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea... or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, [or] explained ... in such work." This provision states the basic dichot-
omy between protectible expression and unprotectible ideas, and clarifies that "copyright does not
preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by an author's work." H.R. REP.,
supra note 27, at 56-57; see also National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("[Protection of the fruit of a compiler's labor may be a
doctrine in search of conceptual underpinnings ...... ); Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's,
1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,617, at 18,765 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1984).
115. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see
also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1982). Section 103(b) provides that copyright on a compilation does
not protect the preexisting or public domain material in the work, but only the author's original
contribution--the author's selection, coordination or arrangement of that material. Although the
Copyright Act of 1909 similarly limited the scope of protection afforded to such works, see Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 7, 64, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (repealed 1976), section 103(b) is "intended to
define, more sharply and clearly than does section 7 of [the 1909 Act], the important interrelation-
ship and correlation between protection of preexisting works and of 'new' material in a particular
work." H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 57.
116. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 n.8, 203 n.l I (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11 [E] at 2-167 (Watergate exam-
ple). This principle also was recognized prior to the 1909 Copyright Act. In Simms v. Stanton, 75
F. 6, 13 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896), the court stated that, "'[tihere is no recognized principle which will
prevent a subsequent compiler from copying materials from an existing compilation, and arrang-
ing them and combining them in a new form."' Id (quoting E. DRONE, A TREATISE OF THE LAW
OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 424 (1879)).
117. See National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 598
(N.D. I11. 1982) (incentives are "swept away" if protection is so limited); Denicola, supra note 6, at
530; Taylor, supra note 5, at 53-54.
118. See National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 599
(N.D. 111. 1982); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16 to -16.1; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (primary purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of works of
authorship with reward to the author being a secondary consideration).
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right protection to a compiler's original selection and arrangement ensures
that the copyright monopoly cannot extend to public domain materials, re-
gardless of the manner in which they are described or explained. 19
b. The subjective selection rationale
Some courts have held compilations to be protected, not because of the
compiler's labor, but because he "exercised subjective judgment and selectivity
in choosing items to list.' 20 The selection of the data, apart from the data's
arrangement, is recognized as original, protectible authorship.' 2' This doc-
trine is supported by the Copyright Act's express protection of a compilation,
which is defined as "a work formed by the collection . . . of data that are
selected. . . or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship."'' 22
For a work to be protectible, however, the selection must involve some
significant subjective judgment.' 23 An ordinary telephone directory would not
be protected because no judgment is used in selecting the numbers and
names.' 24 Similarly, compilations in which the selection is dictated by func-
tional considerations, such as a listing of ingredients, also are not pro-
tectible.' 25 In contrast, subjective judgment is required in choosing names to
119. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 103(b) (1982); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16 to -17.
Regardless of the amount of "sweat on the compiler's brow," if his original selection or arrange-
ment of data is not copied, no basis exists for finding copyright infringement. 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16.1 to -17; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d
195, 202 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). It is not clear
whether courts will disregard those decisions that prevent the copying of public domain material
and thereby require a second compiler to gather his own data. N. BooRsTYN, supra note I, § 2.19,
at 60-61. See, e.g., Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702, 722 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Although
these decisions encourage independent research, 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16; cf
Taylor, supra note 5, at 54 (public interest in having historians do independent research), and
prohibit misappropriation of the compiler's labors, National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 598-601 (N.D. 111. 1982), they undermine the Copyright Act's
limitations on protection and may offend first amendment interests. See supra notes 111-18 and
accompanying 
text.
120. Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 901, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Adventures in Good
Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1942); College Entrance
Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1941); List Publishing Co. v. Keller,
30 F. 772, 773 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 413 F.
Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Denicola, supra note 6, at 530-35; f. Taylor, supra note 5, at 41-42
(historian's selection and arrangement of facts may be copyrighted).
121. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 3-16.1; Denicola, supra note 5, at 531.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
123. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984); Dow Jones & Co.
v. Board of Trade, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 901, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); New York Times Co. v.
Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 n.2 (D.N.J. 1977); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 2.04[B], at 2-41 to 2-42, & n.15.1.
124. New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 n.2 (D.N.J.
1977). A telephone directory is usually protected because of its arrangement or, in some jurisdic-
tions, because of the author's labor in compiling it. See, e.g., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.,
566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
125. See, e.g., Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.
1959); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.0l[B], at 2-14 to -15.
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include in a social register,126 stocks to include in the Dow Jones listings,127 or
names and data to include in credit reference books;t28 these compilations
therefore are protectible.
A historian, journalist, or biographer also exercises subjective judgment
in deciding which facts to include in his narrative; it may be argued, therefore,
that the collection of facts in his book is a protectible work of authorship.'
29
The compilation and directory cases, however, often are interpreted as a sepa-
rate classification; 130 analogizing these cases to other factual works may be
inappropriate.13 1 Section 103(b) requires an original contribution beyond pre-
existing facts, and the section 101 definition of compilation must not be inter-
preted so expansively as to undermine that requirement. 32 Facts should not
be protectible merely because the author exercised judgment in choosing
them;133 furthermore, since the narration of facts ordinarily proceeds chrono-
logically, the arrangement of the facts is not protectible. 134 Any copyright
protection of facts-whether for selection, arrangement, labor, or fair competi-
tion-requires subsequent authors to engage in wasteful, duplicative re-
126. See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 n.2.
(D.N.J. 1977); List Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
127. Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(selection and analysis of certain blue chip stocks representing a variety of business endeavors as
the basis for the determination of the Dow Jones Averages, held to be a list subject to copyright
protection)
128. National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595 (N.D.
I. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to recover even though its arrangement not copied); see also Eckes v.
Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (selection and listing of baseball cards and values
protectible); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(copyright protection for topic selection and arrangement of textbook).
129. Denicola, supra note 6, at 538, 542.
130. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984); Financial Information,
Inc. v. Moody's, CoPYRirr L. RaP. (CCH) 1 25,617, at 18,765 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 10, 1984). But see
National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 601 (N.D. Ill,
1982) ("[D]irectory cases, rather than being a breed apart, are the most striking illustrations in
copyright law that the misappropriation doctrine [has found a home]."). See also Note, Mrura note
6, at 627-31 (This note criticizes setting the directory cases apart as a separate classification for fear
that some works will be denied effective protection. It suggests a "strata approach" as a basis for
protecting the labors involved in compiling such works.).
131. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 n.8, 203 n.l I (2d Cir.
1983), certgranted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); Denicola, supra note 6, at 538; ef. Hill,
supra note 6, at 59; Taylor, supra note 5, at 42. Although the preparation of compilations depends
primarily on an author's industry and requires little in the sense of creativity or authorship, com-
pilations are protected. "Copyright law and compilations are uneasy bedfellows" because the law
is not well suited for dealing with such works. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d
Cir. 1984).
132. SeeHarper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 n.8, 203 n.l I (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. grantea 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(b)
(1982).
133. The mass of facts through which an author sifts and selects are materials in the public
domain that cannot be protected merely because of the author's selection efforts. See Gorman,
supra note I, at 1583. This rule, however, must not be read to suggest that copyright cannot be
claimed on a nonchronological selection of facts, as in an almanac, textbook, or book of lists. See
supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. See also Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (copyright protection for topics in text on child psychol-
ogy); 1 M. NMMsR, supra note 2, § 2.11[D], at 2-164.
134. Myers v. Mail & Express Co., 36 Copy Dec. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 2.11[D]. See also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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search' 3 5 and may impede first amendment interests. 136
IV. REJECTIONS OF ToKsvta
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has rejected
the Toksvig approach. Decisions in this circuit afford little copyright protec-
tion to nonfiction literary works' 37 and permit later authors to rely extensively
on prior works.
A. Repudiation in Rosemont
In Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc.,138 a corporation con-
trolled by Howard Hughes that had acquired the copyrights to magazine arti-
cles about Hughes alleged that a subsequent biography infringed its rights. It
was clear that material from the articles was contained in the biography. The
trial court found infringement, in part because of defendant's failure to con-
duct sufficient independent research.' 39 The court relied on the Toksvig prin-
ciple that an author is not entitled to use the fruits of another's labor in lieu of
independent research."4
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's conclusion as a mat-
ter of law. It analyzed Toksvig,141 and stated:
W]e, however, cannot subscribe to the view that an author is abso-
lutely precluded from saving time and effort by referring to and rely-
ing upon prior published material. . . . It is just such wasted effort
that the proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts, and to a
lesser extent the privilege of fair use, are designed to prevent.142
135. Gorman, supra note 1, at 1604. Cf. Denicola, supra note 6, at 538, 541 (fair-use defense
available to subsequent authors using copyrighted collections and presentations of facts); Hill,
supra note 6, at 59, 60-63 (flat rejection that research is not authorship is not warranted; the fair-
use defense should govern use of research).
136. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202, 204 (2d Cir.
1983), cert granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); supra note 84.
137. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984); National Business Lists,
Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, (N.D. I. 1982) (citing Rosemont Enters.,
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967)). But see
Huie v. NBC, 184 F. Supp. 198, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (broad dicta supporting To/csvig rule, but
defendant's television show about one of the marines who raised the flag on Iwo Jima not en-
joined despite its similarities to plaintiff's book--key question was whether defendant "appropri-
ated plaintiff's literary treatment of'historical facts' "). See also Hill, supra note 6, at 51; Taylor,
supra note 5, at 50-51.
138. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
139. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y.), rev', 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). The lower court also rejected defend-
ant's fair-use defense, in part because of the lack of independent research. It acknowledged, how-
ever, that facts are in the public domain and that an author may be guided by earlier works. Id at
66.
140. Id. See also Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310. Defendants had relied on previously published
newspaper and magazine articles and similar materials.
141. The court cited Nimmer's treatise for the proposition that Toksvig could be limited to a
finding of substantial and material copying, but noted that the opinion's language was much
broader. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310. See also supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
142. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310.
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The court also explained that its earlier statement in Orgel v. Clark Boardman
Co.143 that an author could not appropriate the "'fruits of another's labor and
skill in order to publish a rival work' 144 only meant that "'[tlhe second histo-
rian or second directory publisher cannot bodily appropriate the research of
his predecessor.' 145 Although this explanation is inconsistent with the con-
clusion that an author may rely on prior material, the court seemed to equate
bodily appropriation of research with substantial, verbatim copying or para-
phrasing of protected expression.146 Thus, under Rosemont, verbatim copying
or paraphrasing of protected expression is prohibited, but reliance on the re-
search of another is allowed.'
47
B. The Hoehling Rejection
In Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.148 there was more emphatic
rejection of Toksvig and its protection of research through copyright.
Hoehling, author of Wfho Destroyed the Hindenburg., had completed exhaus-
tive research of the investigative reports and published materials about the
1937 Hindenburg disaster. He also had interviewed many people, including
survivors. His book, published in 1962, was written in an objective, journalis-
tic style; it concluded that the airship was sabotaged by a crew member trying
to please his girlfriend. 149 Ten years later defendant Mooney published a
143. 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 371 U.S. 817 (1962).
144. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310 (quoting Orgel, 301 F.2d at 120).
145. Id (quoting Huie v. NBC, 184 F. Supp. 198, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
146. The court noted that the infringer in Orgel, an author of a book on eminent domain, had
adopted as his own a prior author's " 'analysis, organization of material, phrasing and citations
... ' Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310 (quoting Orgel, 301 F.2d at 120). Rather than relying on his
predecessor's research, defendant appropriated the first author's protected form of expression.
The court also cited West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910), a
case in which one publisher extensively copied lists of decisions and headnotes in case digests
from another publisher's work. This was held not to be a fair use. The copying enabled the
second publisher to save time and effort, but nevertheless infringed because there was an appro-
priation of the first publisher's protected expression, arrangement, and selection. Rosemont, 366
F.2d at 310 (citing West Publishing, 176 F. at 838); see also Hill, supra note 6, at 49-50.
147. The extent to which Rosemont undercut Toksyig is uncertain. Rosemont allows an author
to save time and effort by relying on prior published material but also quotes the statement from
Hule v. NBC, 184 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), that "one cannot bodily appropriate the research
of his predecessor." See Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310 (quoting Hule, 184 F. Supp. at 200). Hule
seemed to adopt the Toksvig rule by using the following example in dictum:
[I]f an historian had published a history of the negotiations between the Soviet Union
and the United States with respect to nuclear explosions and copyrighted it, it would be
an infringement of the copyright for another historian to publish a history re-written
from the first historian's book without any independent research.
Rule, 184 F. Supp. at 200. Despite this broad statement plaintiff was unsuccessful because he
could not prove that defendant copied plaintiff's treatment of the facts. See supra note 137.
148. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters,,
723 F.2d 195, 203 n. Il (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); 1 M.
NIMmiER, supra note 2, § 2.1 1[E], at 2-166 and n.35.1. Nimmer points out that after Ioehlng, in
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (2d Cir. 1981), the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit again stated in dictum that use of copyrighted material without con-
sent is not reasonable if it bodily appropriates the research of the original. Id at 579. Wilson did
not involve the use of research; instead, Wilson involved defendant's parody of plaintiff's copy-
righted song in defendant's off-Broadway musical show. Id at 578.
149. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 975.
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book that the court characterized as "more literary than historical in its at-
tempt to weave a number of symbolic themes through the actual events sur-
rounding the tragedy" of the Hindenburg.' 50 Universal purchased the motion
picture rights to Mooney's book and retained several writers to prepare the
screenplay. One of the writers had written, twenty years earlier, an unpub-
lished movie scenario based on the deliberate destruction of the airship.'51
The resulting motion picture was of the disaster film genre with fictional char-
acters, subplots, sabotage plans, attempts to defuse the bomb, and the dirigi-
ble's eventual destruction. Hoehling charged that the movie and Mooney's
book had infringed his copyrighted work. 152 Mooney acknowledged consult-
ing plaintiff's book and relying on it somewhat, but claimed that he discovered
his sabotage theory in a 1962 book by Dale Titler. Titler, however, stated in
an affidavit that he had copied Hoehling's sabotage theory.
153
The court of appeals concluded that Hoehling could recover only if he
could prove copying and substantial similarity of copyrightable expression.'
54
With regard to the alleged copying of Hoehling's sabotage plot, the court held
that when the author's idea is an interpretation of a historical event, rather
than a fictional creation, that interpretation is not subject to copyright protec-
tion. Thus, Hoehling's expression of his hypothesis was protected by copy-
right but the idea itself was not. Hoehling's hypothesis, whether or not
original to him, was an idea based entirely on interpretation of facts.
155
The court also discussed Hoehling's claim that defendants had copied
facts uncovered in Hoehling's personal research. The court stated that facts
are in the public domain and that defendants were free to use them:156 "Ac-
cordingly, there is little consolation in relying on cases in other circuits holding
that the fruits of original research are copyrightable. Indeed, this circuit has
clearly repudiated Toksvig and its progeny."' 5 7 Hoehling's copyright claim
failed because the alleged copying was of unprotectible ideas and facts rather
than of plaintiff's protectible expression. l
58
ISO. id at 976.
151. Id. at 975-76. Screenwriter Nelson Giddings had written the unpublished screenplay in
1957, well before the publication of Hoehling's book. Id at 975.
152. Id. at 977.
153. Id. at 975 n.l. Hoehling had not sued Titler. Id
154. Id. at 977. Hoehling's selection, arrangement, and presentation of the facts demonstrated
sufficient originality to justify copyright protection for the whole work. Id. Much of his presenta-
tion, however, was prescribed by the order in which the events occurred. Id Narration of history,
by convention, proceeds chronologically, and that order cannot be protected by copyright. Id at
978 (citing Meyers v. Mail & Express Co., 36 Copy. Dec. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1919)).
155. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978-79. The court cited Rosemont as support for the statement that
the public benefits from encouraging the creation of historical and biographical works. The court
concluded that "broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make us- of historical
subject matter, including theories and plots," id. at 978, noting that all the authors had related the
story differently and, thus, plaintiff's expression was not usurped. Id. at 980. See also Taylor,
supra note 5, at 51-52.
156. 618 F.2d at 979 (citing Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
157. Id. (citations omitted).
158. This decision was correct. Cf. Hill, supra note 6, at 65-66. Contra Taylor, supra note 5, at
51-52. Plaintiff's book was written in a journalistic style. Mooney's book was more literary than
historical, and the movie followed the typical disaster movie formula. The sabotage theory had
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C Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
The absolute rejection of Toksvig gave rise to a seemingly inequitable
result in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 159 Plaintiff, a reporter, wrote a
book about the ordeals of a young woman who had been kidnapped and bur-
ied alive in a wood and fiberglass capsule for eighty-three hours. The young
woman collaborated with the journalist; plaintiff spent more than 2500 hours
interviewing participants and investigating, researching, and preparing the
book, which was published in 1971. A condensed version appeared in
Reader's Digest and the book also was serialized in Ladies Home Journal A
producer for Universal read the condensed version, thought it would make a
good television movie, and gave a copy of the book to a scriptwriter. Univer-
sal negotiated with plaintiff to acquire movie rights to the book but when no
agreement was reached, the scriptwriter was told to complete the screenplay
without using the book. The movie eventually was televised as the ABC
Movie of the Week. Despite conflicting evidence about the extent to which
defendant's writer had relied on plaintiff's book, the jury found infringement
and awarded $200,000 in damages, including lost profits. 16
0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the
most important issue was whether the trial court had erred by instructing the
jury that research is copyrightable. 16 One sentence in a twelve-page jury in-
struction, which otherwise correctly explained the distinction between unpro-
tectible facts and protectible expression, read: "[M]oreover, if an author, in
writing a book concerning factual matters, engages in research on those mat-
ters, his research is copyrightable."' 162 Plaintiff had testified over defendants'
objections about the amount of time he had spent researching the work, and
plaintiff's opening and closing arguments had emphasized the extent and
been suggested in the late 1930s, and Giddings' 1957 scenario-predating Hoehling by five
years-also had been based on the deliberate destruction theory, id at 975, and thus was another
possible source for the movie. Furthermore, many of Hoehling's allegations of copying were friv-
olous; most alleged copying of historical facts. Id at 979 n.6. Copyright policy mandates that
facts be free for all to use. Id. at 980.
Fundamental copyright policy justifies granting new authors of historical works a relatively
free hand in using the research of their predecessors. The law's protection of the author is inci-
dental to its primary goal of encouraging contributions to recorded knowledge. Id at 980 (citing
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d. Cir.), cert. deniea 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
"[A]bsent wholesale usurpation of another's expression, claims of copyight infringement where
works of history are at issue are rarely successful." Id at 974; see also Abrams, sapra note 24, at
510.
See also Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980); infra notes 296-300
and accompanying text. In Suid the court sympathized with plaintiff's argument that defendant
had saved time and effort by relying on plaintiff's research, but concluded that the copyright
statute did not protect the research. Id. at 148.
159. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
160. Id. at 1367. The trial court's opinion has a more complete description of the facts and
evidence presented. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). The coauthor assigned her interest in the litigation to plain-
tiff. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1367. The jury was given a copy of the book and viewed the movie twice,
Id. Defendant's writer had expressed uneasiness in relying so heavily on the book. Miller, 460 F.
Supp. at 986; Hill, supra note 6, at 51-53. Taylor, supra note 5, at 53.
161. Miller, 650 F.2d 984, 1367-68 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
162. Id at 1372; Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 987 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
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copyrightability of his research. Furthermore, the trial court had stated that it
viewed "the labor and expense of the research involved in the obtaining of
those uncopyrightable facts to be intellectually distinct from those facts and
more similar to the expression of the facts than to the facts themselves."'
163
Based on these factors, the court of appeals found that the "research-is-copy-
rightable theory" permeated the entire liability phase of the trial.
164
The court of appeals stated that "[tihe issue is not whether granting copy-
right protection to an author's research would be desirable or beneficial, but
whether such protection is intended under the copyright law."' 65 Plaintiff ar-
gued that protection could be based on the same principles that protect compi-
lations, but the court rejected that extension of copyright. Although the court
acknowledged difficulty in distinguishing language in the compilation deci-
sions that had protected the labor of compilers, it nevertheless concluded that
"[a] copyright in a directory. . . is properly viewed as resting on the original-
ity of the selection and arrangement of the factual material, rather than on the
industriousness of the efforts to develop the information."'
166
163. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1369 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984,
987 (S.D. Fla. 1978)) (statement made in order denying motion for a new trial). The lower court
justified its conclusion by stating that:
it doesn't square with reason or common sense to believe that Gene Miller would have
undertaken the research involved in writing. . .[the book] if... .[he] thought that upon
completion of the book a movie producer or television network could simply come along
and take the profits of the books and his research from him.
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 988 (S.D. Fla. 1978). According to the
court, an author could not be expected to spend time and money researching and gathering facts if
those facts could be pirated so easily. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1369. The court stated that "to hold [that
material] other than research is copyrightable is to violate the spirit of the copyright law and to
provide [others] a license to steal." Id.
164. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1372.
165. Id. at 1369. The court of appeals noted that the trial court's interpretation expanded
copyright to protect not only the labor of expressing but also the labor of research. Id. It rejected
this theory to allow "a subsequent author to build upon and add to prior accomplishments without
unnecessary duplication of effort." Id at 1371-72. It adopted the approach taken in Hoehling,
supra note 148.
166. Id. (citing 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 & n.8, 203 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984) (No. 83-1632). The Miller court of appeals suggested that because the directory cases were
difficult to distinguish, it would be better to recognize them as a special category, rather than
attempt to apply their rationale to other types of nonfiction works. The court noted that "the
special protection granted directories under the copyright law has generally not been applied to
other factual endeavors." Id. at 1370. See also Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862
(2d Cir. 1984) ("copyright law and compilations are uneasy bed fellows"); Financial Information
v. Moody's, 1984 COPYiGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,617 at 18,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("copyright pro-
tection for compilations of factual material is at odds with the basic thrust of the copyright laws
...."). But see Denicola, supra note 6. Professor Denicola argues that research in nonfiction
works should be protected under the compilation rationale. He asserts that compilations are pro-
tected because of the act of aggregating information and not because of the author's arrangement
of the information even though some cases explicitly base protection on the originality of the
arrangement of facts. Denicola, supra note 6, at 527-32. He argues that the appropriation of facts
from a nonfiction work may be controlled "by analogizing from the compilation cases and recog-
nizing authorship in the collection of data chosen by the nonfiction writer." Id. at 538. This
approach, however, does not base copyright protection on the originality of the author's expres-
sion, but on the labor expended by that author.
This approach is an improper application of copyright law. Professor Nimmer notes that
under the Constitution and the Copyright Act, only works of authorship may be protected; expres-
sion is "clearly the very essence of authorship." I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.1 l[E], at 2-167.
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The court of appeals also noted that the Rosemont court had expressly
rejected the idea that research is copyrightable and had adhered steadfastly to
that position in Hoehling167 It found the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit's approach "to be more consistent with the purpose and
intended scope of protection under the copyright law than that implied by
Toksvig."'168 The court also stated that the law's distinction between protected
expression and unprotectible facts balanced the public's interest in encourag-
ing creative activity with the need for unrestrained access to information: that
careful balance could not be maintained if research was copyrightable.'
69
There is no rational basis for distinguishing between facts and the
research involved in obtaining facts. To hold that research is copy-
rightable is no more or no less than to hold that the facts discovered
as a result of research are entitled to copyright protection. . . . [T]he
law is clear that facts are not entitled to such protection. We con-
clude that the district court erred in instructing the jury that research
is copyrightable.
170
The court therefore remanded the case for a new trial.'
71
D. President Ford's Memoirs and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphatically
reaffirmed its rejection of Toksvig in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises.172 Shortly after leaving the White House in 1977 President Ford
granted Harper & Row and Reader's Digest exclusive rights to publish his then
unwritten memoirs. A senior editor from Reader's Digest assisted Ford and
spent almost two years interviewing, researching, writing, and editing. The
memoirs, titled A Time to Heal, were scheduled for publication in the spring of
1979; Time Magazine was licensed to print prepublication excerpts in its April
23, 1979 issue.
In late March 1979 an unidentified source gave a copy of the manuscript
The Miller court's suggestion that the directory cases should be treated as a separate category and
that the principles they invoke should be extended to nondirectory works, is the better interpreta-
tion. The compilation principles are inappropriate for cases involving literary works that are
predominantly factual. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 & n.8
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); see also Note, supra note 6, at
627-30 (argues that the Miller holding, and its statement that the directory cases are unique,
demonstrate that the fact-expression dichotomy is inadequate to include works such as directories
that currently are protected by copyright even though "research" is their only original element); cf.
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984) (scope of
coypright for nonfictual works is narrow in comparison to fictional works).
167. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1370-71. The court described Rosemont as "more soundly reasoned"
than Toksvig. Id at 1371.
168. Id at 1371.
169. Id at 1371-72. The court quoted Hoehling extensively to explain why copyright cannot
extend to the depiction of historical events.
170. Id at 1372; see also Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C. 1980)
(facts are not original to an author and thus not copyrightable).
171. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1372. The new trial was to determine whether Miller's protected ex-
pression had been copied.
172. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
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to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation. Navasky had to return the manu-
script, so in twenty-four hours, he read the manuscript and selected materials
for an article without doing any independent research. The resulting article
was over two thousand words in length; it detailed the events surrounding the
Nixon pardon and several other matters. Navasky eventually learned of
Time's publication plans, and the first paragraphs of his article, which went on
sale in The Nation's April 3, 1979 edition, announced the expected publication
dates of the complete memoirs as well as the Time and Reader's Digest ex-
cerpts. The prepublication contract with Time soon fell through, and shortly
thereafter Harper & Row and Reader's Digest filed suit alleging copyright in-
fringement and several pendent state-law violations.' 73 Defendant argued
that it merely had related facts, and used only a minimal amount of protected
expression to add flavor and credibility. The lower court, however, held for
plaintiffs on the copyright claim, finding that the totality of the historical facts,
memoranda, and President Ford's reflections were protected by copyright.
The Nation's copying-characterized by plaintiffs as paraphrasing or direct
thefts of original expression-was held not a fair use.1
74
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the threshold issue was
whether the material used by The Nation was copyrightable.1 75 The court
noted that the Copyright Act "grants rights not in ideas or facts, but in expres-
sion,. . . [and] is thus able to protect authors without impeding the public's
access to that information which gives meaning to our society's highly valued
freedom of expression."1 76 According to the court, the concept of
copyrightability must be construed in accord with the first amendment; as a
consequence, neither news events nor historical or biographical facts may be
protected. 177 Acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing fact from expres-
sion, the court determined that "The Nation drew on scattered pieces of infor-
mation [facts] from different pages and different chapters, and then described
that information in its own words."'178 It stated that such conduct-para-
phrasing discrete facts-was permissible because the information was not pro-
tected.' 79 Furthermore, because the work described political events of major
173. Id at 197-99; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp.
1067, 1069-70 (S.D.N.Y.) (trial court's summary of the facts), rev'd 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). The court held that plaintiffs' common-law
claims--conversion and tortious interference with contract-were preempted by § 301 of the
Copyright Act. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F: Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). See
also infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
174. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-73 (S.D.N.Y.)
rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). The court
concluded that President Ford's revelations were not news, "hot" or otherwise, and also that the
fair-use defense failed because The Nation's use superseded use of the original by Time. Id The
Nation also argued that most of the material it used was not protectible by copyright; the court
responded, however, that the "totality" was protected by copyright. Id at 1072. The court of
appeals rejected this view. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 204-05.
176. Id, citing I M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 1.10[B]2, at 1-72.
177. Id at 202-04. The court relied on § 102(b) and several cases, including Rosemont and
Hoehling, for support.
178. Id at 203.
179. Id at 204, citing H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 56.
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significance, and the alleged paraphrasings concerned the "very essence of
news and of history," first amendment principles made it necessary to protect
as "expression" only the barest elements-the ordering and choice of the
words themselves.180
By distinguishing between facts and expression, the court of appeals re-
jected the lower court's holding that the "totality" of the facts, memoranda,
and reflections was protected by copyright. 18 The court implied that Presi-
dent Ford's "states of mind" and reflections were unprotected facts under sec-
tion 102(b), but concluded that even if they were assumed to be expression,
their incorporation with other facts did not make those other facts copyright-
able.' 82 The other materials used in the article were from uncopyrightable
government works and from some reproduced statements from other persons
made in conversations with the President-not protectible by plaintiffs' copy-
right.183 Thus, the greatest part of defendant's article reported uncopyright-
able facts. Once these unprotected elements were stripped away, the article
contained, at most, roughly 300 words that were copyrighted.' 8 4 Notwith-
standing Navasky's lack of independent research, the court held that this mea-
ger, infinitesimal taking of President Ford's original expression was fair use.185
These decisions repudiating the Toksvig rule are consistent with the prin-
ciple that copyright protects only original expression.186 To hold that research
180. Id Otherwise, if "expression" were given a broader scope, a writer could "own" an event
merely by being the first to express it. Id.
181. Id at 204-05. See supra note 174.
182. Id at 205.
183. Id
184. Id at 206.
185. Id at 206-08. Accordingly, the court reversed the finding of infringement and award of
damages. Id at 209. It also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs state-law claims. Id at 199-201.
See infra notes 301-09 and accompanying text. Judge Meskill dissented, noting that the article was
"almost entirely a paraphrase, was of trivial originality and contained no independent research by
the author." Id at 214 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Meskill acknowledged that defendant was free to
use the facts in the memoir as part of its own original work; however, he stated that defendant was
not free to "appropriate the same quotes, expressions, selection of language, events, corroboration
and re-creation" present in the original. According to Meskill, The Nation compiled a work that
allegedly reported facts, although it actually had taken Ford's work and "added nothing original
of its own." Id The majority opinion noted that some cases had extended protection to an au-
thor's labors, but that those authorities and that reasoning had been rejected explicitly in
Hoehling. Id at 213 n.1.
186. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940, 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Nimmer supports this repudiation of Toksylg. I M.
NIMMER, supranote 2, § 2.1 l[E], at 2-167; id. § 3.04, at 3-16 to -17; see also Gorman, supra note 1,
at 1584. Contra Denicola, supra note 6, at 535-41.
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984) (No. 83-1870), is another important decision addressing
the issue of factual works and copyright. In Consumers Union the court's analysis was consistent
with Rosemont, Miller, and Harper & Row. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. (CU)
evaluated lightweight vacuum cleaners and published results of its research in Consumer Reports.
Defendant's Regina Powerteam model received a favorable rating and defendant reproduced, ver-
batim, portions of the Consumer Reports evaluation--the fruits of CU's research-in several ad-
vertisements promoting its product. CU's claim of copyright infringement failed because the
court held that defendant's use of the copyrighted evaluation was a fair use. The court empha-
sized that facts cannot be copyrighted and that CU therefore could not prevent defendant from
accurately reporting facts about the results of CU's independent testing. The court also noted that
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is copyrightable would be tantamount to holding that facts are copyright-
able.' 87 The Copyright Act, however, prohibits the protection of discoveries
and it permits authors to save time and effort by using, and building on, the
ideas and information in earlier works.188 The factors together mean that the
scope of copyright protection for a nonfiction work is narrow, 8 9 which may
discourage some authors. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of copyright pro-
tection is to encourage the creation and dissemination of new works of author-
ship and that goal is served best by allowing the free use of others' research. 190
Thus, the Toksvig rule "represents an improper extension of copyright princi-
ples in an effort to protect labor and expense which should either go unpro-
tected or should be protected at best under the rubric of unfair
competition."'' l
V. STATE-LAW PROTECTION OF RESEARCH
Because copyright probably does not protect research, plaintiff authors of
nonfiction works should include alternative claims alleging common-law bases
for protection. Misappropriation, conversion, unfair competition, and, in
some instances, contract and quasi-contract theories all are possible claims
when a subsequent author has used the plaintiff's research.1 92 The availability
the scope of fair use is greater with informational works like Consumer Reports because the risk of
restraining the free flow of information is more significant. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049.
187. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1372. The protection of facts contravenes the law's originality require-
ment. See also Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980), in which the court
granted summary judgment against plaintiff's claim that Newsweek's four-page article on John
Wayne had infringed several passages from his book on war movies. The majority of the material
was factual and not original to plaintiff, id at 147-48; thus, defendant was granted summary judg-
ment. Id at 149. The Suidcourt cited Hoe/lingwith approval and noted that Toksvighad beencriticized sharply. Id. at 148-49.
188. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); H.R. Rap., supra note 27, at 56.
189. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players. Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984);
Hoebling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980); Denicola, supra note 6, at 53 1-32, 542; Taylor, supra note 5, at 33-34. The lower court
in Miller noted that if the public expects individuals to do research, then it must compensate them
in the same manner as those who express the research. To hold otherwise is "to provide to those
•..lacking in requisite diligence and ingenuity a license to steal." Miller v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 988 (S.D. Fla. 1978). That approach, however, improperly extends
copyright to cover facts and information apart from the author's particular mode of expression.
Facts are not original to an author and to afford them protection contravenes the basic principle
that copyright protects expression, Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1977), and it would constitute an intolerable limitation on first amendment
interests. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1983), cert
granted, 104 5. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
190. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974, 980.
191. Gorman, supra note 1, at 1584; see also Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146,
148 (D.C.C. 1980); supra note 189 and accompanying text; ef H.R. RaP., supra note 27, at 56-57.
Such expansive protection improperly extends the copyright monopoly to encompass facts and
information. This protection would impede the public's access to ideas and information and
would be an intolerable limit on first amendment rights. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) UNo. 83-1632).
192. It is common practice to join these pendent state claims with a copyright infringement
claim. Notwithstanding the possible preemption of such claims, the plaintiff risks quick dismissal
of these state claims from federal court in the event that his federal copyright claim, which often is
weak in the case of a factual work, is dismissed before trial. "[In the exercise of its discretion, the
court may dismiss the pendent claim when the federal claim is dismissed prior to trai." Jason v.
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and scope of state-law protection, however, is tied inextricably to the issue of
federal preemption. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the scope of federal
preemption before examining the common-law doctrines available to authors
of nonfiction works.
A. The Scope of Federal Preemption
1. Preemption Before the Copyright Act of 1976
Courts use the preemption doctrine, which is founded on the supremacy
clause of the Constitution, to invalidate state statutes and common-law doc-
trines that conflict impermissibly with federal law.' 93 Federal law preempts
state law when "either. . . the nature of the regulated subject matter permits
no other conclusion, or. . . the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."
194
Pursuant to the Constitution's patent and copyright clause,' 95 Congress has
enacted comprehensive legislation 196 and in several instances state regulation
of some forms of intellectual property has been preempted by the federal stat-
utes. The Supreme Court stated in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. StIffel Co.19 7 that,
These laws, like other laws of the United States enacted pursuant to
constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land ....
When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is
"familiar doctrine" that the federal policy "may not be set at naught,
or its benefits denied" by the state law. 198
The Supreme Court considered questions of federal preemption in Sears
and its companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 199 In each,
the court reversed a decision under state unfair competition law that prohib-
ited the copying on an unpatentable light fixture. 20° The Court noted that
state-law protection under unfair competition "would. . . permit the State to
block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the
public."201 Allowing a state to forbid the copying of a work not subject to
patent protection "would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8,
cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 778 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (citing Wham-O Mfg. Co. v. Paradise Mfg. Co.,
327 F.2d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1964)), affa 217 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 406 (9th Cir. 1983); Walker v.
Time Life Films, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. Rat'. (CCH) 25,554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (state claims
dismissed by state court, when they were equivalent to copyright claim, over which federal courts
have original and exclusive jurisdiction).
193. The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT.
art. VI, cl. 2. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state law obstructing Con-
gress' purpose is preempted).
194. Florida Lime & Advocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
195. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
196. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
197. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
198. Id at 229 (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
199. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
200. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-27, 233; Compco, 376 U.S. at 234-35, 239.
201. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32.
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free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the
public domain. '20 2
The broad language in Sears and Compco strongly suggested that protec-
tion of intellectual property under state law would be preempted whenever it
conflicted, even indirectly, with the objectives of federal copyright and patent
laws.20 3 The Court, however, subsequently restricted the scope of preemption.
Justice Harlan, in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,2° 4 raised in dictum the question of a
state's power to enforce a promise to pay royalties for using an allegedly un-
patentable invention while the patent application was pending. 20 5 The Court
implied that some state-created rights might be sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify some disruption of federal intellectual property policy.2°6 In Goldstein v.
Calfornia207 the Court held that the Constitution's grant of copyright power
to Congress was not exclusive and that states were free to protect published
"writings" that did not fall within the scope of federal copyright law.208 The
Court, however, noted that "a conflict would develop if a State attempted to
protect that which Congress intended to be free from restraint or to free that
which Congress had protected."
20 9
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bieron Corp.2 10 the Supreme Court held that fed-
eral patent law had not preempted a cause of action under Ohio's trade secret
202. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237. The Court, however, noted that state law could prohibit some-
one from copying such a product and palming it off as the original. Id. at 238. See, e.g., John H.
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 384 (11th Cir.
1983) (summary dismissal of copyright claim affirmed because plaintiff's "memory stub" system, a
blank form conveying no information, was not subject to copyright protection; this result, how-
ever, did not preclude submitting plaintiff's trademark and trade dress infringement claims to the
jury).
203. See Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 40-41
(N.D. Tex. 1979); Shipley, Publicity Never Dies, It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and
Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. Rv. 673, 687-88 (1981); Comment, The Misappropriation
Doctrine After the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. Rav. 469, 480 (1977). The decisions
could have been limited to the field of patent law, but a broader interpretation was reasonable
since the federal interests in regulating patents and copyrights are similar. Sears and Compco led
one commentator to argue that the states had been deprived of power to apply the passing-off
doctrine. Patterson, Private Copyright and Public Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28
VAND. L. REv. 1161, 1195 (1975). The decisions significantly influenced lower courts. See, e.g.,
CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318-19 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967); Cable Vision,
Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. deniedsub nom. Klix Corp. v. Cable Vision,
Inc., 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
204. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
205. Id. at 674-75.
206. Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976" The Case ofDroit de Suite,
47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 200, 209 (1978).
207. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
208. Id at 560, 570. Shipley, supra note 203, at 688-89; Comment, supra note 203, at 481.
Defendant in Goldstein had argued that the Copyright Act of 1909, which did not apply to sound
recordings, preempted protection of such writings under state law. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 563-66,
567. The Court, however, upheld a California law that made the pirating of sound recordings a
crime; the legislative history of the 1909 Act reflected no intent to prevent state protection of
categories unregulated by the statute, as long as the state's regulation did not interfere with federal
copyright policy. Id. at 564-71; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[A], at 1-3 to -6. The
states retained residual concurrent powers to regulate copyright, subject to the supremacy of fed-
eral law. Id
209. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559.
210. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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law. Although the misappropriated secret was an unpatentable process, the
Court noted that its uncontrolled disclosure would not benefit the public ap-
preciably.211 The Court redefined the areas open to state regulation by estab-
lishing that state law would not be preempted merely because it related to
intellectual property.2 12 The Court concluded that "[tihe only limitation on
the States is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not
conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress
.... "213 This conclusion allowed states to regulate the use of intellectual
property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law, thereby expanding
the potential scope of state intellectual property legislation.2 14 The fundamen-
tal preemption issue therefore became "not whether state law reaches matters
also subject to federal regulation, but whether the two laws function harmoni-
ously rather than discordantly." 215 Goldstein and Kewanee permit state regu-
lation of intellectual property unless it conflicts with the objectives of federal
law.
2 1 6
2. Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976
The Goldstein and Kewanee decisions demonstrated that state and federal
regulation of intellectual property is concurrent;217 they also indicated a re-
treat from Sears and Compco.218 After these decisions, however, Congress en-
acted the Copyright Act of 1976,219 which specifically prohibits state
regulation of certain types of intellectual property.
In one of the most significant changes in copyright law, section 301 of the
Act created a single system of federal protection for all published and unpub-
lished "works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
211. Id at 479, 482-83. The Court predicted that protection of the rights under state trade
secret law would not lead to disregard of the patent system. Id at 483-93.
212. I1d at 478-79. The Court summarized its Goldstein decision: "at least in the case of writ-
ings, the States were not prohibited from encouraging and protecting the efforts of those within
their borders by appropriate legislation." Id
213. Id at 479.
214. See id at 479-80; see also Abrams, supra note 24, at 512; Katz, supra note 206, 208-10.
215. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir.), cert.denead 449 U.S. 983 (1980). In
Morseburg, the court upheld a California statute that required that artists be paid a five percent
royalty each time one of their paintings was resold. The court determined that California's adop-
tion of droit de suite provided the artist an additional right not contained in the Copyright Act of
1909, but not conflicting with federal copyright law.
216. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479-80. "[I]f the scheme of protection developed by [a state] ..
'clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws,'. . . then the state law must fall." Id. at
480; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[A], at 1-6; Abrams, supra note 24, at 532; Katz,
supra note 206, at 208-10; Shipley, supra note 203, at 690. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440
U.S. 257 (1979), is another important preemption decision. The Court held that federal patent law
did not prevent state-law enforcement of an agreement to pay royalties on sales of certain articles.
The articles embodied an invention for which a patent, though sought, was never issued. Id at
259-60.
217. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[A], at 1-6.
218. See Katz, supra note 206, at 208-10; Shipley, supra note 203, at 701 n.204; see also De-
Costa v. CBS, 520 F.2d 499, 510 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. deniea 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
219. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)). The
law became effective on January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
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sion."220  The section effectively abolished common-law copyright and
established that state laws regulating copyright generally are preempted.221 A
state law is preempted if two conditions are satisfied: the state right protected
must be "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106"222 and the subject matter protected by
the state-law doctrine must be a fixed work of authorship that comes within
the subject matter of copyright specified in sections 102 and 103.223 Section
301(b) preserves state laws protecting materials not within the subject matter
of copyright,224 or rights not equivalent to any of the enumerated exclusive
rights. 225 That section is intended "to make clear, consistent with the 1964
Supreme Court decisions in Sears. . .and Compco. . .that preemption does
not extend to causes of action, or subject matter outside the scope of the re-
vised Federal copyright statute."
226
To determine whether a state law is preempted, a court first must deter-
mine whether the work being protected is within the subject matter of copy-
right, which is defined in the Act as "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression .... -227 This definition incorporates the
220. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982); see A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 12; UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT
OFFIcE, GEN. GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT AcT OF 1978 2:1 (1977).
221. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B] at 1-8; Shipley, supra note 203, at 701 & n.204.
Section 301 made moot much of the Goldstein and Kewanee decisions. Katz, supra note 206, at
211. The section provides:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created
before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively
by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or
statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) Subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium
of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Congress intended to provide "a single Federal system" of statutory copy-
right that "would greatly improve the operation of the copyright law and would be much more
effective in carrying out the basic constitutional aims of uniformity and the promotion of writing
and scholarship." H.R. RP., supra note 27, at 129.
222. The exclusive rights specified in § 106 include the rights to reproduce the copyrighted
work, to prepare derivative works based upon it, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work, and
to perform or display the work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
223. See Abrams, supra note 24, at 549; Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary
Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA. L. REv. 1107, 1112
(1977); supra note 221. The two criteria for preemption must coalesce. Comment, suTra note 203,
at 409; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01IB], at 1-9.
224. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1982).
225. I. § 301(b)(3).
226. H.R. RP., supra note 27, at 131, see Abrams, supra note 24, at 560-61.
227. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Section 102(a) lists seven broad categories of works of author-
ship: literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words; dramatic works, includ-
ing any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictoral, graphic, and
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standard of originality from the Copyright Act of 1909.228 The fixation re-
quirement is satisfied when a work is embodied "in a copy or phonorecord
. ..[and] is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration. '229 Unfixed works, however, are not copyrightable and may receive
equivalent state-law protection.230 The subject matter test is clouded by sec-
tion 102(b), which provides that copyright cannot extend to any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is embodied, described, or explained.
23'
Since copyright protection is not available for these matters, they are arguably
not within the subject matter of copyright, and state-law protection of them is
not preempted.2
32
The second issue is whether the right protected by state law is equivalent
to one of the exclusive rights in section 106. Generally, if the right is infringed
by an act that constitutes copyright infringement-unauthorized reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display-then the right is equivalent.233 If some
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audio-visual works; and sound recordings. The listing
is illustrative and does not exhaust the scope of original works that the Act is designed to protect.
H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 53; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definitions).228. H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 51; see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
230. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B](2)(a), at 1-23. Examples of unfixed works include
"choreography that has never been filmed or notated, an extemporaneous speech, 'original works
of authorship' communicated solely through conversations. . . and a dramatic sketch or musical
composition improvised or developed from memory and without being recorded or written
down." H.R. RaP., supra note 27, at 131. The states may protect such works until they are fixed in
a tangible form, even by creating rights that are equivalent to copyright. I M. NIMMER, sira note
2, § 1.01[B](2)(a), at 1-23.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Facts are equivalent to discoveries. See Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 n.7 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984) (No. 83-1632).
232. See Abrams, supra note 24, at 560-61. An unequivocal conclusion, however, is not possi-
ble. See A. LATMAN, supra note I, at 33-35. The states cannot protect a work within §§ 102 and
103 that fails to achieve copyright protection because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to
qualify or because it has fallen into the public domain. H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 131. This
restriction appears to prohibit state-law protection of facts or discoveries since they are not origi-
nal and are in the public domain. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d
195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). On the other hand,
since copyright cannot extend to facts because they are not writings within the copyright clause,
they technically are outside the scope of the subject matter protectible by copyright and state
protection should not be preempted. See A. LATMAN, supra note I, at 34; 1 M. NIMMER, sipra
note 2, § L.01[B](2)(b), at 1-23 to -25; id § 2.11[E], at 2-165 n.30.
Arguably, Congress cannot provide copyright protection for facts, so it cannot preempt the
state from enacting such legislation. I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[E] at 2-165 n.30. Contra
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983) (court con-
cluded that the work fell within the subject matter of copyright even though large portions of it
were unprotectible materials), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); Abrams, supra
note 24, at 562-63. See supra notes 172-85 and accompanying text; infra notes 301-02 and accom-
panying text. To conclude otherwise would permit the states "to expand the perimeters of copy-
right protection to their own liking" on a theory that preemption would not bar state protection of
materials that did not satisfy federal standards. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200. Allowing such
state action would create "vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection" contrary
to the intent of section 301. Id (citing H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 130); see also infra notes 286-
324 and accompanying text.
233. The state claim must protect rights that are qualitatively different from the rights of re-
production, performance, distribution, or display to escape preemption. Harper & Row, Publish-
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other element must be established to constitute a violation in addition to, or
instead of, one of those acts, however, the state right is not equivalent to a
federal right and is not preempted. Thus, assume that a movie producer and
an author contract with the understanding that the producer will consider the
author's manuscript as the basis for a movie. The producer determines not to
use the manuscript and returns it, but then makes a movie derived from it.
The author's breach of contract claim, an action to enforce a state-created
right, should not be preempted by copyright law because the author must al-
lege and prove more than acts of reproduction, distribution, performance, or
display.
2 34
The equivalent-rights test of the section 301 preemption analysis, how-
ever, is rarely so easy to apply. The legislative history does not clarify matters;
early versions of section 301(b)(3) preserved state remedies for breaches of
trust and contract, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, de-
ceptive trade practices, and misappropriation that was not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights.235 Opposition to the use of misappropriation claims re-
sulted in an amendment that deleted these examples from the final version of
the statute.236 The congressional debate and the additions to and deletions
from section 301 obscure legislative intent so that it is unclear whether any of
the deleted claims are preserved. Other than misappropriation, the examples
seem to be state-created rights that should escape preemption.
The continued vitality of misappropriation, however, is less certain.
237
One court has stated that Congress, by deleting the examples,
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); accord, Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo
Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 943 (W.D. Tex. 1982); see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 1.01 [B], at 1-I to -12 ("If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution or
display.., will in i/self infringe the state created right, then such right is preempted.").
234. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983)
("when a state law violation is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere repro-
duction or the like, the rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur"), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); see infra notes 322-36 and accompanying text; cf
Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co., 668 F.2d 1207 (1lth Cir. 1982). The legislative history of
§ 301 suggests that actions for breach of contract are not preempted. H.R. RaP., sup.ra note 27, at
132. In discussing the equivalent rights test, Congress noted that:
[t]he evolving common law rights of "privacy," "publicity," and trade secrets, and the
general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the causes of
action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or
confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.
Id
235. H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 24, 132. Earlier versions of § 301 did not list all of these
state-created rights. See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); HOUsE JUDICIARY COMM., 88TH
CONG., 2D SSS., PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REvISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS
AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 18 (Comm. Print 1964). Reports accompanying those earlier
versions observed that the legislation would preempt causes of action referred to as misappropria-
tion. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1967). Later drafts added misappro-
priation actions that did not protect rights exclusively within copyright. These later drafts also
added trespass and conversion actions. See, e.g., S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 30(b)(3), 122 CONG.
REc. 3849 (1976).
236. The Justice Department was the chief opponent to listing misappropriation as a pre-
served claim. It argued that this exception would defeat the section's underlying purpose. See
Shipley, supra note 203, at 704-05; Comment, supra note 203, at 487-88.
237. See Abrams, supra note 24, at 548; Shipley, supra note 203, at 705-06.
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must have decided it was better to permit the states in the first in-
stance through statutory or decisional law to specify or fashion
"rights or remedies" that fall within clause (3), subject, of course, to
court application of the copyright law limitations of clause (3).
While deleted from clause (3), those causes of action remain illustra-
tive of "certain types of misappropriation, not preempted under sec-
tion 301." 238
Another court was more equivocal about the impact of the deletions: "it is
unclear. . . whether Congress thereby intended to leave the state law of mis-
appropriation intact. The court concurs with Professor Nimmer's view that
§ 301(b)(3) as finally enacted requires a determination as to whether state mis-
appropriation law is 'equivalent' to copyright." 239 It is reasonable to conclude
that a misappropriation claim generally must be analyzed under section 301
just as any other state-law claim; misappropriation may escape preemption
only when the subject matter involved is not copyrightable or when the right
to be vindicated is not equivalent to a right protected by copyright.
240
B. Potential State-Law Remedies
Nonfiction authors have used several common-law causes of action to
supplement copyright protection. Misappropriation is the most advantageous
claim with which to protect research, although claims for breach of an express,
quasi-, or implied-in-fact contract or unjust enrichment also are possible.
Such claims must be examined under the two-tiered test of section 301 as well
as under Sears-Compco principles, however, to determine whether they sur-
vive federal preemption.
1. Misappropriation
The misappropriation doctrine potentially is available whenever a person
imitates or uses a work developed at the expense of another.24 ' Misappropria-
238. Mitchell v. Penton/Industrial Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22, 25 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
Plaintiff in Mitchellargued that defendant had infringed plaintiff's copyright and therefore should
be held liable for unfair competition because defendant had appropriated many of the factual
elements of plaintiff's book. Id. at 22-23. The court held that the unfair competition claim was
preempted because it was asserted to protect rights equivalent to those protected by copyright. Id.
at 25-26.
239. Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Home Box Office's (HBO) counterclaim asserted that plaintiff was misappropriating HBO's sig-
nals and broadcasting them without authorization. Plaintiff apparently had misled customers to
believe that HBO's service was plaintiff's production; plaintiff was not passing off its services as
HBO's. The court noted that the movies televised by HBO are copyrightable subject matter under
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982), so the key preemption issue was whether the state-law claim was
equivalent to rights set forth in § 106. HBO asserted that it had lost the right to exhibit its audio-
visual works for a profit; the court concluded that this right was equivalent to the performance
right. HBO's unfair competition claim therefore was preempted. Orh-O-Vision, 474 F. Supp. at
682-84 & n.12.
240. Abrams, supra note 24, at 537-48 (legislative history of preemption of misappropriation is
in a state of confusion); Shipley, supra note 203, at 706 & n.236.
241. Letter from Michael M. Uhlmann, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, to
Senator Robert Kastenmeier (July 27, 1976). The misappropriation doctrine applies to facts like
those in Miller: an author's research, done at considerable time, expense, and labor, and then
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tion has evolved into an independent prohibition against conversion of an-
other's investment. It does not provide the defenses available under passing-
off and unfair competition theories,242 and it has been employed successfully
against unauthorized users of public domain materials.
243
The doctrine was developed in International News Service v. Associated
Press.244 International News Service (INS) did not have access to the cables
that wired war news from Europe, so it copied the news from the Associated
Press' (AP) bulletin boards and member newspapers on the east coast. INS
then wired the news to its west coast clients. Because some of INS's west coast
papers were published earlier than AP's western editions, INS was able to
publish the war news before AP. The Supreme Court held that INS's conduct
was actionable, 245 and noted that although the expression of news is copy-
rightable,246 the "news" itself is not created by an author and is in the public
domain.2 47 Because AP was not seeking protection for its expression, it was
forced to depend on the law of unfair competition for relief.248 The Court
noted the inequity that would result if INS prevailed:
[INS] admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by com-
plainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor,
skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money,
and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is
endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to
newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appro-
priating to itself the harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of all
disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with
the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely
expressed in a book, is used by another who writes a screenplay for a movie, without copying the
author's expression but also without doing any independent research, writes a screenplay for a
movie. This copying deprives the original author of a natural market for his work because he
expected to capitalize not only in print media but in derivative media as well. The defendant who
used the original author's research without doing any independent research is guilty of misappro-
priation, just as INS was liable for misappropriating the news from AP. International News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See infra notes 244-53 and accompanying text. The
second author's actions diminish the value of the original author's work in the medium of the
second work-motion pictures-and deprive the first author of a fair return on his investment.
Misappropriation has a strong visceral appeal because it affords relief against a second author who
seeks "to reap where [he] has not sown." International News Service, 248 U.S. at 239.
242. Goldstein, supra note 223, at 1116. See Baird, supra note 31, at 413; Comment, supra note
203, at 479-80.
243. See Abrams, supra note 24, at 510-11, 513, 517; Denicola, supra note 6, at 517 n.7 and the
cases cited therein.
244. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
245. Id at 231-32, 238-39. Baird, supra note 31, at 412.
246. AP had not protected its stories by copyright, in part because the law's notice require-
ments made protection difficult to retain. Baird, supra note 31, at 412 n.5.
247. "It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered
Congress [to protect works by copyright] intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the
first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it."
International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234. The Court recognized that because the news is facts, it
is not a writing within the Constitution's copyright clause. Id; see also I M. NIMMER, supra note
2, § 2.1l1E], at 2-165 n.30.




at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a
material portion of the profit, from those who have earned it to those
who have not.249
Despite this expansive language recognizing AP's quasi-property interest
in the news it gathered, the Court only postponed the time during which INS
could "participat[e] . .. in the process of distribution and reproduction of
news that it had not gathered" to the extent necessary to prevent INS from
benefitting from AP's labor.250 This postponement allowed INS to continue
using the unprotected news, though at a later date, while maintaining an in-
centive for AP to gather and disseminate the news.251 More importantly, the
Court recognized a cause of action for misappropriation-the conversion of
the investment, labor, or skill of another for one's own use2 2-without requir-
ing misrepresentation or "palming off.
'" 253
The court's emphasis on "reaping where . .. [one] has not sown" led
other courts to focus on unjust enrichment elements, such as the existence of a
competitive relationship, rather than on unfair competition elements. 25 4 As
one court noted,
[t]he modem view as to the law of unfair competition does not rest
solely on the ground of direct competitive injury, but on the broader
principle that property rights of commercial value are to be and will
be protected from any form of unfair invasion or infringement and
from any form of commercial immorality .... 255
This extended misappropriation doctrine became "a device through which
states prevent copying where statutory copyright will not."
'256
249. Id at 239-40. The Court distinguished between the public's right to use the information
conveyed by AP and a competitor's right to use the information to compete unfairly. Thus, the
Court recognized a quasi-property interest, valid only against a competitor. See Comment, supra
note 203, at 479.
250. International New , Serv., 248 U.S. at 241.
251. Baird, supra note 31, at 415; see International News Ser., 248 U.S. at 233.
252. International News Ser., 248 U.S. at 236; see B. KAPLAN, supra note 51, at 86-87.
253. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241-42. INS did not represent to readers that the
news was gathered by AP, but even if INS had given AP credit for the story, it still would have
been liable for unfair competition because it misappropriated AP's information without paying for
it. Baird, supra note 31, at 413.
254. Comment, supra note 203, at 479-80.
255. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affad 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). Misappropria-
tion has been defined as having three elements: creation of plaintiff's product through extensive
time, labor, skill and money; defendant's use of that product in competition with plaintiff, thereby
gaining a special advantage since defendant has not been burdened with the development ex-
penses incurred by plaintiff, and commercial damage to plaintiff. Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (citing Dannay, The Sears-
Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 132, 134(1976)).
256. Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1116. Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1105 (2d Cir.
1982) (noting the "incalculable variety" of illegal practices falling within the unfair competi-
tion/misappropriation rubric under New York law); Financial Information v. Moody's, 1984
CoPYRmrHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,617 at 18,766-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Abrams, supra note 24, at 515;





Whether misappropriation is preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976 or
earlier common-law principles has been debated at length.257 To the extent
that the misappropriation doctrine merely prevents reproduction and distribu-
tion while the Copyright Act does not, the rights being protected appear to be
equivalent to those protected by section 106.258 The doctrine of misappropria-
tion, however, does not function solely as another means to prevent copying.
When direct competition exists, misappropriation seemingly protects "the lim-
ited right of a commercial enterprise to be free from unfair competitive prac-
tices that deprive it of a fair return on its work and investment. '2 59 Although
the claimant may have no right to protect his work from use by the public at
large, he may have limited rights against unfair acts of a competitor.2 60 In
such competitive circumstances, misappropriation arguably protects rights
other than those in section 106 and should not be preempted.
261
257. See Abrams, supra note 24, at 537-73; Baird, supra note 242, at 424; Shipley, supra note
203, at 705-06; see also supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. Even if the Act's specific
statutory preemption provision--§ 301-is not applicable, it appears that the preemption cases
decided prior to the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976 still are applicable and may preempt
state-created rights that impermissibly conflict with copyright objectives. See Klitzner Indus., Inc.
v. H.K. James & Co., 535 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In Klitzner, the court determined that
plaintiff's misappropriation claim was preempted under the Sears-Compco doctrine and never
considered the applicability of§ 301, even though the cause of action arose after the effective date
of the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. at 1257-58.
258. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-17; Abrams, supra note 24, at 517; Goldstein,
supra note 223, at 1116; see, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc., v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 918-19 (2d
Cir. 1980); Videotronics, Inc. v. Band Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983) (elements of
misappropriation established, but the work appropriated was a computer program subject to copy-
right protection that had been available to the public; thus, plaintiff's state-law claims were pre-
empted); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980); Walker v. Time Life
Films, Inc., 1983 COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) 25,553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (misappropriation and
unfair competition claims held to be equivalent).
259. Comment, supra note 235, at 491; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-20
(discussing New York's law of unfair competition, which bans any form of commercial immoral-
ity); see, e.g., Sellers v. ABC, 668 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1982) (recovery may be permitted in New
York for misappropriation of an idea or theory if the idea is novel, the idea is in concrete form,
and defendant makes use of the idea); Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection,
94 A.D.2d 347, 464 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983) (state-law claim of unfair competition based on alleged
appropriation of film transparencies not dismissed under Act's preemption provisions; dissent ar-
gued that equivalent reproduction and distribution rights were at core of plaintiffs c6mplaint); cf.
Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Because the
Copyright Act treats facts, discoveries, ideas, and theories uniformly in § 102(b), it is plausible to
argue that New York courts also would treat them uniformly, and thus, under the Sellers criteria,
would allow recovery for the misappropriation of research upon a similar showing.
260. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239; 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-20;
Comment, supra note 203, at 491.
261. Comment, supra note 203, at 491-92. Requiring a plaintiff to prove unfairness and an
unjustifiable attempt to profit from another's labors may distinguish the action apart from copy-
right infringement. See, e.g., Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (New
York law of unfair competition, banning "any form of commerical immorality" and requiring
proof of bad faith, not preempted), aff'4 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 1.0 1[B], at 1-20. Professor Nimmer, however, does not agree that the necessity of
proving these elements preserves the state-law remedy. See id § 1.01[B], at 1-20 to -21 (stating
that the argument is circular); accordRand McNally v. Fleet Management Sys., 1984 COPYRIGHT
L. REP. (CCH) 25,624, at 18,799, 18,811 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1983) (immorality and wrongdoing
are not additional elements; however, breach of a fiduciary duty may take the claim out of§ 301).
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The legislative history of section 301 provides some support for this ap-
proach. The House Report stated:
[S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under
traditional principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of unau-
thorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the liter-
ary expression) constituting "hot" news, whether in the traditional
mold of International News Service v. Associated Press or in the
newer form of data updates from scientific, business, or financial
data bases. 2
62
Thus, misappropriation appears to be preserved to the extent that it prohibits a
pattern of unfair use by a competitor.263 In addition to proving the reproduc-
tion of material similar to "hot news," the claimant would have to demon-
strate that the defendant was both a competitor and engaged in a pattern of
misappropriation. Even if the plaintiff could prove these elements, however,
the general uncertainty in this area of law still may lead some courts to hold
that a misappropriation claim has been preempted.
264
A nonfiction author normally would be unable to demonstrate a pattern
of misappropriation; because of the nature of his work the misappropriation is
ordinarily a one-time event. Competition between two authors often could be
proved, however, because the second work would diminish the potential mar-
ket of the first work-particularly when the second work was derivative.
265
Such competition would supply the requisite additional element to enable the
misappropriation claim to escape preemption under section 301. The basic
cause of action, however, still would be an allegation that the second author
reproduced and adapted, without authorization, the information contained in
the plaintiff's book. The element of competition would not appear to add any-
thing to the usual copyright infringement claim; rather, it would seem to exist
262. H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 132.
263. "Section 301 is not intended to preempt common law protection in cases involving activi-
ties such as false labeling, fraudulent representation, and passing offeven where the subject matter
involved comes within the scope of the copyright statute." Id at 132. To the extent that a misap-
propriation claim involves these additional elements, it should not be preempted by § 301.
264. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 681,439 N.E.2d 526 (1982)
(Dow Jones I). In a declaratory judgment action brought by the Board, the Illinois appellate court
found that the preparation of an index by Chicago's Board of Trade, based on the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, which is protectible by copyright, violated proprietary rights of Dow Jones.
Thus, the court enjoined the Board from using the Industrial Average, citing International News
Serv. v. Associated Press. Id at 689-97, 439 N.E.2d at 532-37; see also Baird, supra note 242, at
425 & n.63 (Dow Jones Industrial Average calculations are easily upheld). Although the misap-
propriation claim seemingly was equivalent and could have been preempted, the Dow Jones I
court did not discuss § 301 preemption. But cf. Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago,
546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (DowJonesll). In Dow JonesII, plaintiffsought an injunction
to prevent the Board from using its lists, which the court held were subject to copyright protection.
The court stated that the Board of Trade had misappropriated elements protectible by copyright,
but nevertheless denied injunctive relief because the Board's action constituted fair use. Id at
119-21. In each case the challenged activities involved the reproduction of Dow Jones' copyright-
able materials. The misappropriation claim was equivalent and the court in Dow Jones I should
not have recognized it as a ground for relief.
265. In Miller, ABC's production of a television movie derived from Miller's book effectively
destroyed the demand for Miller's work in the film media. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 984, 985-86 (S.D. Fla. 1978); see supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
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in nearly every infringement situation. Therefore, unless a pattern of misap-
propriation also could be proved, the misappropriation claim would be
preempted.
Schuchart & Associates, Professional Engineers, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp.
2 6 6
involved allegations of copyright infringement, misappropriation, and unjust
enrichment with respect to architectural and engineering drawings. 267 De-
fendants contended that the misappropriation claim was preempted. The
court stated that the architectural drawings were within the subject matter of
copyright; therefore, the first prong of the section 301 test was satisfied.
268
With regard to the second prong, the court stated that preemption was re-
quired "when state law rights are not 'different in kind'" from copyright.
269
Thus, the rights being protected under federal and state laws must be com-
pared to ascertain whether the state-protected rights "are qualitatively different
from the [federally-protected] rights of reproduction, performance, distribu-
tion, or display." 270 The court defined the elements of misappropriation as:
(1) plaintiffs' creation of their product "through extensive time, labor, skill or
money"; (2) defendants' use of plaintiffs' product in competition with plaintiff,
at minimal expense to defendants (free ride); and (3) commercial damage to
plaintiffs' product because of defendants' use.27 1 The court noted that plain-
tiffs were required to prove that defendants had copied the drawings under
both the misappropriation and the copyright claims. In conclusion, the court
held that the state and federal rights were equivalent, even though misappro-
priation also required defendants' competitive use of plaintiffs' products and
commercial detriment to plaintiffs; those additional elements, however, did
not make the misappropriation claim different in kind from a copyright claim.
Thus, in Schuchart, as in other cases in which the plaintiff could not establish a
pattern of unfair use,272 the misappropriation claim was deemed equivalent
and thus preempted by federal copyright law.273
266. 540 F. Supp. 928, 950 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (defendant's unauthorized use of the copyrighted
drawings and plans of a shopping center gave rise to a nonpreempted unjust enrichment claim);
see infra notes 383-390 and accompanying text.
267. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants did not create, produce, or distribute certain architec-
tural drawings but sought to deceptively and fraudulently use plaintiff's work. Schuchart v. Solo
Serv. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 933-35, 942 (W.D. Tex. 1982). Defendants argued that this allega-
tion in effect charged them with misappropriation and moved to dismiss the claims. Id. at 942.
268. Id. at 943. Protection extends to literary, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (5) (1982).
269. Schuchart v. Solo Serv. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 943 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
270. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 852
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis in original), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F. 2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632)).
271. Id. at 943-44.
272. The decisions that distinguish between copying (or reproduction) and misappropriation
are probably in error. No substantive distinction exists between such actions. 1 M. Nimmer,
supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-19; cf Abrams, supra note 24, at 526. Misappropriation is but another
label for reproduction. But see Rand McNally v. Fleet Management Sys., 1984 COPYRIGHT L.
REP. 25,624 at 18,799, 18,811 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (misappropriation claim directed against use of
facts from compilation, as opposed to reproduction of the entire compilation, may escape § 301
preemption).
273. Schuchart v. Solo Serv. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 944 (W.D. Tex. 1982). The court ac-
knowledged that, under different facts, an unfair competition claim might protect different rights,
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b. Subject matter
In the absence of a pattern of misconduct, the author's strongest argument
against preemption is not that the state and federal rights are different in kind,
but that the research appropriated is not within the subject matter of copyright
as required by section 301.274 Copyright protection subsists in fixed, original
works of authorship, including literary works,2 75 compilations, and derivative
works.276 Protection, however, does not extend to any "discovery" or idea
regardless of the way it is expressed.277 Because copyright may not be claimed
in facts but only in the manner in which facts are expressed, arranged, or se-
lected, the states arguably are free to protect facts per se under misappropria-
tion.278 This argument, however, is only true if Congress' intent in enacting
section 102(b) was to save ideas and facts from preemption, rather than to
preclude equivalent state protection of them altogether.
27 9
Section 102(a), in describing the protected subject matter categories, re-
fers to "works of authorship." Section 102(b) then states: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
...or discovery .. ".. ,280 One could interpret section 102(b) to include
ideas and discoveries in the definition of "original works of authorship," but
not those protected by the Act. If this is true, the list of unprotected elements
in section 102(b) would be "subject matter within the meaning of section
102(a)-and therefore subject to preemption although not protected under the
statute." s28' This interpretation, however, seems incorrect because none of the
such as palming off, passing off, or likelihood of confusion; if so, it would escape preemption. Id
& n.12. In Schuchart, however, plaintiffs were seeking to enforce an equivalent right. Id. See also
Giangrasso v. CBS, 534 F. Supp. 472,478 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), in which the court noted that "[clourts
.in this circuit have consistently recognized that claims for unfair competition are 'equivalent to
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright' and are preempted. . . ." See also Dur-
ham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1980); Najarian v. Tobias, COPYRIGHT
L. REP. (CCH) 25,595 (D. Mass. 1983); Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 26 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 196 (D. Nev. 1983); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., COPYRIGHT
L. REP. (CCH) 25,554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 18, 1983). But see Sellers v. ABC, 668 F.2d 1207,
1210 (1Ith Cir. 1982) (interpreting New York law); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1104-
06 (2d Cir. 1982) (misappropriation claim survives preemption under Sears-Compco principles);
Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 94 A.D.2d 347, 464 N.Y.S.2d 506
(1983) (unfair competition claim survived preemption).
274. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1982) preserves the state-created rights of works not within the
subject matter of copyright.
275. Id § 102(a)(l). Equivalent state-law protection of unfixed works is not preempted. Id
§ 301(b)(1).
276. Id. § 103(a).
277. Id § 102(b).
278. A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 34; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-23 to -25; see
Rand McNally v. Fleet Management Sys., COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,624 at 18,799, 18,811
(N.D. IlI. 1983) (misappropriation claim against use of facts from compilation and copying of
plaintiff's "procedures, processes, and systems" not preempted under § 301 because such matters
are excluded expressly from the subject matter of copyright by § 102(b); however, potential first
amendment problems exist). On the other hand, if facts are not within the subject matter of
copyright, all state rights or remedies are preempted. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1982),
279. Cf A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 34; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1,01[B], at 1-23 to -26;
Goldstein, supra note 223, at 1118-20.
280. 17 U.S.C. §102(a)-(b) (1982).
281. Goldstein, supra note 223, at 1119 (citing H.R. REp., supra note 27, at 57).
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elements listed in section 102(b) appear to be original works. Rather, section
102(b) is phrased to prohibit protection for ideas and discoveries as they are
embodied in the original works of authorship. Facts are not original works of
authorship, which is precisely the reason that copyright does not protect
them.282 Thus, because facts are not within the subject matter of copyright,
equivalent state protection should not be preempted;283 however, the House
Report of section 301 stated:
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter cate-
gories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from pro-
tecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright
because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or be-
cause it has fallen into the public domain.
284
This legislative history indicates that Congress intended to preempt equivalent
state protection for any work within the general scope of the subject matter of
copyright. If a work as a whole is protected by copyright, equivalent state
protection of the work should not be allowed, even if parts of the work are not
protectible: a biography or historical account is a copyrightable literary work
within section 102(a)(1). A work consisting of unprotectible facts is not
outside the subject matter protected by the Act. Because the entire work is
protectible under the Act, all equivalent state-law claims arguably are pre-
empted,285 including misappropriation claims for "stolen" facts or research.
Section 102(b) should not be interpreted to preserve discoveries (facts) for
equivalent state-law protection.
The few decisions dealing with these issues have not been consistent. In
United States Trotting Association v. Chicago Downs Association286 the court
stated in a footnote that a claim of misappropriation of the facts in race horse
eligibility certificates was not preempted.287 This misappropriation claim,
however, was unique because plaintiffs were trying to recover for the actual
physical taking of the certificates, rather than for any use of the unprotected
information; therefore, this misappropriation claim was not equivalent to
282. 1 M. NiMmER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-24.
283. Id. The first amendment may limit state-law protection of facts. Id. at 1-25; see supra
note 84. Professor Nimmer also states that insofar as the International News Service case was
concerned with news per se, rather than the expression of the news, the AP misappropriation
claim would escape preemption under § 301 because news per se is not a writing within the Con-
stitution's copyright clause. Id at 1-25 n.102; cf Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 723 F.2d 195, 200, 203-06 (2d Cir. 1983) (news events are not protected by copyright but are
protected by the first amendment; court would void an attempt by a state to protect news events),
cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). But see Abrams, supra note 24, at 563.
284. H.R. Rep., supra note 27, at 131.
285. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterps., 723 F.2d 195, 200, 203-06 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); Gf A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 34;
Abrams, supra note 24, at 563; Goldstein, supra note 223, at 1119 & n.52. Otherwise, the state
"could expand the perimeters of copyright" to protect material not meeting federal standards.
This state-law expansion would create "vague borderline areas between State and Federal protec-
tion" and circumvent one of the central purposes of the Act--the establishment of comprehensive
federal copyright standards. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); see supra note 265.
286. 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981).
287. Id. at 785 n.6.
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copyright.288 In Werlin v. Reader's Digest Association289 the court treated
plaintiff's work as both an article and an idea. To the extent it was an article,
the work enjoyed copyright protection; to the extent it was an idea, the work
enjoyed limited state-law protection but no federal copyright protection.
290
Such a cursory analysis appears to preserve equivalent state-law remedies for
matters excluded from federal protection by section 102(b).
In the litigation over President Ford's memoirs, however, the trial and
appellate courts preempted state-law claims for conversion and tortious inter-
ference with contract.291 The lower court determined that President Ford's
unpublished manuscript was an original, autobiographical, nonfiction, literary
work; that much of it was not protectible as news did not negate its
copyrightability.2 92 Because the work was "within the general category of
works which may qualify for copyright protection, e.g., a literary work as op-
posed to facts constituting 'hot news,' "293 the subject matter prong of the sec-
tion 301 test was satisfied, and the state-law claims were found to be
equivalent and preempted.2 94 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, noting that the entire work was copyrightable despite
the fact that portions of it were unprotectible facts. The court of appeals
feared that if the states were free to protect discrete uncopyrightable elements
of a work that otherwise was protected by copyright, a vague borderline be-
tween state and federal protection would develop. This result was precisely
what the Act was intended to prevent.
295
Neither of the Nation opinions examined the actual materials misappro-
priated by defendant. Instead, both focused on the entire manuscript as a
copyrightable work of authorship, embodying the appropriated materials.
Similarly, in Suid v. Newsweek Magazine,296 the court did not analyze the ac-
tual materials that were misappropriated. Plaintiff authored a book titled
288. Id at 785-86 n.6; see also I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01 [B] at 1-25 n. 102. The court
cited 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1982) (the nonequivalent rights proviso) to support its conclusion that
the claim was not preempted. Chicago Downs, 665 F.2d at 786 n.6.
289. 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
290. Id at 467; Abrams, supra note 24, at 563-64; see also Rand McNally v. Fleet Management
Sys., Copxiorr L. REP. (CCH) 25,624, at 18,799, 18,811 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (facts, procedures,
processes, and systems are excluded from protection by § 102(b)); Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F.
Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
291. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y
1980), af'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of state-law claims), cert. granted, 104
S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); see also supra notes 172-185 and accompanying text.
292. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 850, 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (citing H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 131), ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
293. Id at 851.
294. The court concluded that the two state-law counts were not different in kind from copy-
right and, therefore, were preempted. Id at 852-54.
295. Harper &,Row, 723 F.2d at 200 (citing H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 130-31); see supra note
285. The court of appeals analyzed the equivalent rights prong of the section's preemption test
and concluded that no qualitative differences existed between plaintiffs' state-law claims and the
exclusive rights under the Act. Id at 200-01. The court also determined that plaintiff's alternative
theory of conversion failed, even though it escaped preemption, because the interference with
property rights was too insubstantial. Id
296. 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C.. 1980).
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"Guts and Glory--Great American War Movies," and alleged that Newsweek
published a subsequent story about the late John Wayne that infringed plain-
tiff's copyright and competed unfairly by misappropriating his research. The
copyright claim failed297 and the court, not willing to extend such protection
to plaintiff's research, held that the state-law claim was preempted.298 To de-
termine whether the materials misappropriated were within the subject matter
of copyright, the court focused on plaintiff's entire book, not on the materials
themselves. The court merely noted that, "[a]s plaintiff concedes, his book is
clearly a literary work within the subject matter of copyright.
'299
By limiting their analysis to whether entire works are copyrightable, the
Nation and Suid courts have ignored that the misappropriated facts and re-
search are outside the scope of copyright protection under section 102(b), re-
gardless of how they are expressed.3°° The subject matter test arguably is not
satisfied when the complete work is within the subject matter of copyright and
the materials appropriated are not. It is possible that these state-law claims
should be preempted for other reasons, such as first amendment interests or
under a Sears-Compco analysis, 30 1 but section 301 preemption is not
a foregone conclusion.
30 2
c. General principles ofpreemption
Although it is uncertain whether section 301 preempts misappropriation
claims, the principles of Sears and Compco may preempt some forms of state-
law protection. The Kewanee and Goldstein decisions reduced the preemptive
thrust of Sears-Compco;30 3 however, it still is impermissible for the states to
297. Id at 147-48. Some of the misappropriated material was factual, some was not original
to Suid and thus was not protected by his copyright. Newsweek's minimal copying of protected
material was held to be a fair use.
298. Id at 148-49.
299. Id at 149. Plaintiff asserted a right to control reproduction, which is an exclusive right.
Id Plaintiff argued that Newsweek's failure to attribute authorship to him was an additional
necessary element to his state-law claim, and, therefore, was not preempted. The court, however,
held that a nonexistent doctrine could not supply the extra element required to preclude preemp-
tion. Id
300. See, e.g., Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also infra notes 375-81, 390-95 and
accompanying text.
301. In a sense the court of appeals in the Nation case responded to this issue by stating that
the states cannot be allowed to expand the scope of copyright to protect materials not meeting the
federal statutory standards. See supra note 232. See also infra notes 303-25, 396400 and accom-
panying text. Although this conclusion is correct, general principles of preemption preclude state-
law protection that is equivalent to copyright for facts. Furthermore, protection against the copy-
ing of facts might create an intolerable limitation on first amendment rights. Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).
302. Courts have held that neither news events, historical facts, nor facts of a biographical
nature, are deserving of the Acts's protection. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters.,
723 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). Because these
materials are not subject to copyright protection, the subject matter prong of the § 301 preemption
test is not satisfied and statutory preemption fails. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying text.
Contra Abrams, supra note 28, at 563-64 (§ 102(b) was not intended to grant authority to the states
to protect facts and information).
303. See supra notes 203-16 and accompanying text.
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regulate the use of intellectual property in a manner inconsistent with federal
law.3 4 In Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc.,30 5 plaintiff alleged
that defendant's publication infringed plaintiff's daily racing form.306 The
copyright claim failed because defendant had not copied plaintiff's mode of
disseminating the data,30 7 but merely had used plaintiff's materials to prepare
its own competing racing form. 308 The court noted that Sears and Compco
preempt state regulation of unfair competition of matters within the broad
confines of the Constitution's copyright clause. 309 Goldstein had limited only
the thrust of those cases by "holding that the copyright and supremacy clauses
by themselves, in the absence of congressional expression, did not prohibit any
state incursions into the area."' 310 Thus, under Sears-Compco, since federal
copyright law protected plaintiff's racing form within constitutional limits, the
attempt to protect that work under state law was preempted.
3 "
In finding preemption, the court in Triangle Publications, like later courts
construing section 301, concentrated on plaintiff's entire work, rather than on
the unprotectible raw data that had been appropriated. Similarly, in Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.312 plaintiff joined an unfair competition claim
with his copyright infringement action.313 Because the alleged violation oc-
curred prior to the effective date of the new Act, section 301 was not dis-
cussed.314 Nevertheless, the trial judge and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the state-law claim because it would
conflict with federal policy: "Where, as here, historical facts, themes, and re-
search have been deliberately exempted from the scope of copyright protection
to vindicate the overriding goal of encouraging contributions to recorded
knowledge, the states are preempted from removing such material from the
public domain." 315 The same preemption analysis was applied in Suid v.
304. "[A] conflict would develop if a state attempted to protect that which Congress intended
to free from restraint or that which Congress had protected." Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559. Further-
more, the Goldstein Court noted that if failure to meet federal statutory standards had been in-
volved, rather than subject matter left unaddressed by Congress, it would not have been disposed
towards preemption. Id. at 569-70.
305. 415 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1976). This case involved the Copyright Act of 1909.
306. Id at 683.
307. Id at 686.
308. Id at 684.
309. Id at 686.
310. Id
311. Otherwise, the state protection would conflict with federal copyright policy. Id. at 686-87
(citing Jacobs v. Robitaille, 406 F. Supp. 1145, 1153 (D.N.H. 1976)); see also Abrams, supra note
24, at 537. In Goldstein, the Supreme Court stated that "a conflict would develop if a State at-
tempted to protect that which Congress intended to free from restraint or to free that which Con-
gress had protected." Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559. The conflict in Triangle Publications stemmed
from an attempt to extend state law to prohibit defendant from copying data that could not be
protected by copyright.
312. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
313. Id at 977; see supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
314. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 976-77. The alleged violations occurred in the early 1970s; the
action was instituted in 1975. The new Act does not annul or limit common-law causes of action
arising from acts commenced before January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2) (1982).
315. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 980 (citing Sears and Compco.)
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Newsweek Magazine,316 in which the court, so as not to contravene federal law
by protecting matters deliberately exempted from copyright protection,317
held that Suid's unfair competition claim was preempted.
In Mitchell v. Penton/Industrial Publication Co.,318 plaintiff alleged that in
writing a book on records retention he had spent many hours sending ques-
tionnaires to government agencies and compiling data. Defendant then pub-
lished an article on records maintenance, and plaintiff alleged copyright
infringement and that defendant had misappropriated plaintiff's facts and had
traded on plaintiff's good name and reputation.319 The court, in discussing
defendant's use of plaintiff's facts, stated that a claim of passing off would not
be preempted under section 301.320 The court concluded, however, that mis-
appropriation was the gravamen of plaintiff's claim that defendant had taken
plaintiff's information and had traded on plaintiff's good name.321 Because
the claim merely alleged the copying of items deemed to be in the public do-
main, it was similar to those in Sears and Compco. The court stated that if
plaintiff's copyright infringement action was successful, his misappropriation
claim would be redundant. On the other hand, if plaintiff's copyright claim
failed, Sears-Compco would apply, the state claim would be preempted, and
the alleged infringer would be permitted to copy the work. Thus, the court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss this "misappropriation" claim. 322
Discoveries and ideas arguably can be protected by state law because they
are not within the statutorily defined subject matter of copyright. Blanket
adoption of this interpretation, however, would undermine section 301. To
ensure that states do not protect facts and information that Congress intended
to be used freely, misappropriation claims should be preempted under Sears-
Compco. The basic goals of copyright and misappropriation are the same-
copyright protects the plaintiff's expression and misappropriation protects the
business advantage derived from the plaintiff's work. Enforcement of a mis-
appropriation claim concerning facts or research would contravene Congress'
explicit statement in section 102(b) that discoveries and ideas cannot be pro-
tected, regardless of how they are embodied in a work. Misappropriation
claims must be preempted because they "would interfere with the federal pol-
icy, found in article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing
316. 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
317. Id. at 149 (citing Hoehling.) The Suid court also held that the claim was preempted under
§ 301. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
318. 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
319. Id. at 22-23. Plaintiffs second count charged defendant's misappropriation saved time
and expense, that defendant did little original research, that defendant relied on plaintiffs infor-
mation, and that defendant gained an unfair commercial advantage as a result. Id. at 23. Defend-
ant moved to dismiss this count on preemption grounds. Id. at 23.
320. Id. at 25. The unfair competition claim of passing off is not a right equivalent to a § 106
right, because it requires an additional element to those required for copyright infringement-
plaintiff must prove that defendant is passing off his goods to the public with the express or im-
plied representation that they are plaintiff's goods.
321. Id at 25. The court focused on the question of equivalent rights, not on the issue of
protectible subject matter.
322. Id at 26. The dismissal was without prejudice to plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff could assert a
state claim consistent with the opinion.
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federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent
and copyright laws leave in the public domain. 32 3 Furthermore, the statute's
essential dichotomy-granting protection for original expression as opposed to
ideas and facts-also accommodates first amendment interests by protecting
an author's expression without impeding the public's access to information.
3 24
Thus, even though equivalent state protection of facts and research under the
misappropriation doctrine may survive section 301, the principles announced
in Sears-Compco, even as modified by Goldstein and Kewanee, should prevent
recognition of such a claim.325
2. Alternatives to Misappropriation
Given the limited copyright protection available for nonfiction works and
the potential preemption of misappropriation under section 301 and Sears-
Compco, the author and researcher probably must rely on other common-law
theories to protect against unauthorized use of his facts and research. Some
common-law actions, such as breach of an express or implied-in-fact contract,
should withstand preemption, while others, such as quasi-contract and unjust
enrichment, may not.
To withstand preemption, a plaintiff's state claim must demonstrate that
section 301 is not applicable. Under the second prong of the section 301
323. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8); Sf Goldstein, 412 U.S. at
559. Enforcement of a misappropriation claim to protect plaintiff's research prohibits the use of
facts that, under copyright policy, are available for all to use.
324. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); see supra note 84. State-law protection of re-
search may impinge free speech interests. Cf. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11 [E], at 2-169.
Nimmer asks whether anyone would suggest seriously that the Washington Post had copyright to
the facts of Watergate because its reporters, Woodward and Bernstein, discovered many of those
facts through their exhaustive research. Id
325. Except in cases such as International News Serice, in which a pattern of misappropria-
tion by a competitor has been established, the misappropriation doctrine is preempted-under
either § 301 or Sears-Compeo. See, e.g., Klitzner Indus., Inc. v. H.K. James & Co., Inc., 535 F.
Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Giangrasso v. CBS, 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Suid v. News-
week Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a.'d in part and rey'd in part, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983),
cer. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Com-
puting Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Federal preemption of state misappropriation ac-
tions is the proper result. Because works embodying facts are subject matter protectible under
§ 102, a misappropriation claim would be preempted to the extent that the doctrine merely pro-
tects against copying. If a court looks at the discrete elements appropriated from the work and
concludes that facts are not within the subject matter of copyright, then § 301 would not apply andthe states could protect an author's research. Contra Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. NationEnters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983) (state protection of research may infringe on first amend-
ment rights), cer. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632). State-law protection, however,
can be allowed only to the extent that this protection is not inconsistent 
with the purposes of the
Copyright At. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479-80; Goidsteitn 412 U.S. at 559. Because § 102(b)states that discoveries are not protected by copyright, equivalent state-law protection of research
always conflicts with this statement, and would be preempted under Sears.ConppCo. See, e.g.,
Harpier & JRos, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. grante4g 104 5. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632).Butsee Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1105-06 (2d Cir. 1982) (unfair cmpetition claim
arising prior to the Act, based on misap priation of an unpublished work, escapes preemption
because common-law claims concerning unpublished works were not affected by Sears- Compco).
Furthermore, state-law protection may contravene first amendment interests. See supra note 84.
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test,326 it is unclear whether facts fall within the subject matter of copyright as
defined in sections 102 and 103, and whether state claims consequently are
preempted under section 301.327 Thus, the plaintiff's stronger argument is
based on the first prong of the section 301 test-that his state claim does not
protect rights equivalent to the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright.328 The Act's congressional history indicates that it was not in-
tended to preempt all common-law theories:
The evolving common law rights . . . would remain unaffected as
long as the causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of
personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are differ-
ent in kind from copyright infringement. Nothing in the bill dero-
gates from the rights of parties to contract with each other and to sue
for breaches of contract.3
29
To preserve his claim, plaintiff must establish that elements other than, or in
addition to, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display are
necessary elements of his state-law claim.330 Furthermore, to avoid preemp-
tion under Sears-Compco the plaintiff also must demonstrate that the state-law
protection does not offend federal intellectual property policies.
331
a. Express contracts
A breach of contract claim must establish an agreement involving a quid
pro quo, performance by the plaintiff of all conditions precedent, and breach of
the contract by the defendant.332 Because these elements are not identical to
the elements of an infringement action, the contract action is not equivalent to
infringement and should escape section 301 preemption, regardless of whether
the materials that the defendant uses are protectible.333 Furthermore, because
a contract remedy-whether damages, specific performance, or restitution-
would apply only to the contracting party, a contract claim would not offend
federal copyright policy. Therefore, Sears-Compco would not mandate pre-
emption.334 Under a contract claim, the plaintiff author would be able to
326. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 274-302 and accompanying text.
328. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1982). An early version of § 301(b)(3) listed several examples of
nonpreempted remedies, including breaches of contract, breaches of trust, trespass and conver-
sion. S. 22, 94th Cong., 2nd. Sess., § 301, 122 CONG. REc. 3849 (1976); see supra note 235 and
accompanying text.
329. H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 132.
330. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.04[C], at 16-25.
331. See supra notes 193-216 and accompanying text.
332. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 112 (2d ed. 1977).
333. The promise to pay for use of materials consitutes the necessary additional element. See
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-13; 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.04[C], at 16-25.
334. Cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). The Quick Point Court con-
sidered whether federal patent laws preempted a state law that allowed enforcement of an agree-
ment to pay royalties on the sale of articles that embodied a particular invention. The inventor
had applied for, but not received, a patent for the invention; the contract obligations, however, did
not depend on issuance of the patent. Id. at 258-61. The court of appeals concluded that the
contract action was preempted, because enforcement of the contract would contravene "'strong
federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain." Id at 261 (quoting
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force the defendant to pay for the use of the plaintiff's materials even though
the facts and research are in the public domain. Sears-Compco does not re-
quire a contrary result because contract enforcement would not prevent others
from using unprotected elements in the plaintiff's nonfiction work. 335 With
respect to such other unauthorized users, the plaintiff would have to rely on his
copyright to protect his original expression, but not his facts or research.
336
b. Implied-in-fact contracts
Even if an author cannot prove that an express contract governs a defend-
ant's use of the author's nonfiction work, he may be able to prove that an
implied-in-fact contract existed. For example, under New York law337 a con-
tract will be implied in fact when the evidence demonstrates that the parties
intended payment for use of the plaintiff's materials, even though that inten-
tion was not expressed orally or in writing. 338 An implied-in-fact contract dif-
fers from an express contract in that it is created by conduct rather than words;
the preemption issues for the two claims therefore do not differ.339 Accord-
ingly, an implied-in-fact contract remedy should survive preemption.
340
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969)). The Supreme Court reversed, noting that com-
mercial transactions traditionaly are regulated under state law, id at 262, and that enforcement of
the agreement would not conflict with the aims of the patent system. /d. at 262-63. See also
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 478-79. The manufacturer in Quick Point was obligated to pay royalties
whether or not the patent was issued. Because the patent was never issued, the manufacturer's
competitors eventually were manufacturing and selling the same device with no obligation to pay
royalties to the inventor because the invention had entered the public domain. Quick Point, 440
U.S. at 260. The Supreme Court nevertheless held the original manufacturer to its contract. Id. at
266.
In Sellers v. ABC, 668 F.2d 1207 (1Ith Cir. 1982), plaintiff Sellers informed ABC's investiga-
tive reporter that he had an exclusive story on the death of Elvis Presley. Prior to any disclosure
the parties signed an agreement that guaranteed Sellers all copyrights to the story, required ABC
to credit him with uncovering the cause of Presley's death, and obligated Sellers to deal exclu-
sively with ABC. After the contract was executed, Sellers disclosed his theory that Elvis was
murdered either by a withdrawal of cortisone or suffocation. Id at 42. A year later ABC televised
a special on Elvis' death that was based solely on the work of its own investigative reporter and
did not deal with any of the theories suggested by Sellers, id at 42; Sellers nevertheless sued. His
contract claim failed under New York law because an essential element was held to be vague,
indefinite, and incomplete and because ABC had not breached the contract since it did not use his
theory. Id at 43. The court did not even discuss the possibility that the contract claim was
preempted.
335. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. CBS, 213 U.S.P.Q. 289, 289 (D. Mass. 1981) (plaintiff could have
protected his idea by contract, but his unconditional disclosure made it the property of all because
copyright protection does not extend to ideas or concepts); Cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 262-64 (1979); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479-80, 489-91. Because enforcement of a
contract will not prevent others from utilizing the unprotected elements of the plaintiff's work, the
contract claim is not preempted.
336. See supra notes 34-70 and accompanying text. Once the plaintiff's facts, ideas, and theo-
ries are disclosed unconditionally-for example by publication of his book--copyright is the
plaintiff's only recourse.
337. SeegenerallyJ. CAAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-12 (2d ed. 1977)
(discussion of the law of implied contracts and of quasi-contract remedies); D. DOns, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIEs § 4.2, at 234-35 (1973) (general discussion of remedies available in
restitution actions).
338. Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
339. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.041[C], at 16-30 to -31.
340. See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485,489-90 (9th
Cir. 1984) (plaintiff unsuccessful in proving copyright infringement but court determined that he
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In Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc, 341 plaintiff alleged that she had sub-
mitted a twenty-nine page format for a movie that contained ideas Columbia
eventually used in making the movie "Shampoo. '342 The California Court of
Appeals limited plaintiff's potential recovery on the implied-in-fact contract
claim to the "reasonable value" of her ideas as used in the movie.3 43 The jury
returned a $185,000 verdict, but the trial court granted a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. This judgment was affirmed by the court of ap-
peals.344 Because plaintiff's claim involved events that occurred before the
effective date of the new Act, section 301 was not at issue.345 Nevertheless, the
court's discussion of the implied-in-fact contract claim is useful for analyzing
whether that claim would be preempted by section 301. Because plaintiff had
reduced her ideas to a written format, which is protectible subject matter
under section 102.346 Thus, the preemption issue would be whether the con-
tract claim protects rights equivalent to the exclusive rights in section 106.
The court stated that the existence of the contract depended on whether
Columbia, knowing that the format was offered to it for sale, accepted and
used any part of the format in the movie.347 Because there was no express
agreement, plaintiff had to demonstrate an implied promise to pay:
[P]laintiff must demonstrate that she clearly conditioned her offer of
[the format] upon an obligation to pay for it, or its ideas, if used by
Columbia; and Columbia, knowing the condition before it knew the
ideas, voluntarily accepted their disclosure. . . and found them val-
uable and used them.3
48
Plaintiff had to prove conduct from which Columbia's promise to pay reason-
ably could be implied.34 9 These elements of proof-knowing the conditions,
voluntary acceptance of disclosure, valuable ideas, and use-are not elements
may have an implied-in-fact contract remedy under California law); Smith v. Weinstein, 1984
COPYRIGHT L. REP. 25,625, at 18,813, 18,818-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (pendent state contract claims
not preempted because the claims involved the relationships between the parties, not copyright
rights).
341. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468 (Cal. CL App. 1982).
342. Id. at 469. Warren Beatty and Robert Towne also were defendants.
343. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for plagiarism, quasi-contract, breach of an implied-in-
fact contract, and breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. All but the implied-in-fact
contract claim were dismissed by the trial court. Id.
344. Id. at 471.
345. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2) (1982).
346. Id. § 102(a)(l) (1982) (literary work fixed in a "tangible medium"). Plaintiff, however,
was upset over the use of her "ideas" of six principal characters in a beauty salon, rather than her
manner of expressing the ideas. See Mann, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 470. Whether § 301 precludes
equivalent state-law protection of ideas not subject to copyright protection is debatable. See 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 2, §1.01[B], at 1-23 to -26; supra note 274 and accompanying text. Compare
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (although
plaintiff's specific claims were preempted, other nonequivalent state protection is possible) with
oehling v. Universal City Studios, K., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980) (states are preempted
from removing from the public domain those matters left unprotected by Congress).
347. Mann, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 476.
348. Id. at 476-77.
349. Id. at 477. Plaintiffs evidence on the essential elements was rebutted by defendant's
"clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence" that the format never was submitted to Columbia
and that there was no access or use. Id. at 478.
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of a copyright infringement action. Thus, an implied-in-fact contract claim
should escape preemption regardless of the nature of the subject matter.
The court also suggested that proof of substantial similarities between the
format and the movie could give rise to an inference of access and use to
support plaintiff's claim; that claim was rebutted successfully by defend-
ants.350 The elements of such an inference, however, appear similar to those
of a copyright infringement action--defendant's access to plaintiff's work,
similarities between the works, and a material and substantial taking.35' This
apparent equivalence to copyright does not warrant preemption, however,
since other elements still must be proven for a plaintiff to recover under an
implied-in-fact contract action. The remaining additional elements-volunta-
riness and the defendant's knowledge of conditions of tender 352-are not nec-
essary elements in a copyright action;353 therefore, the implied-in-fact
contract claim should not be preempted.3
54
The implied-in-fact contract remedy may be appropriate for a case such
as Miller,355 in which the parties could not reach a financial agreement, but
defendant nevertheless produced a movie based on plaintiff's book.356 In
Miller plaintiff sought damages for copyright infringement and unfair compe-
tition, but apparently did not assert a contract claim,357 possibly because the
parties' negotiations were so unsuccessful that a court would be unlikely to
find any agreement from their course of conduct.358 Plaintiff, however, was
able to establish that Universal was willing to pay for movie rights, that its
writers used his book in preparing the movie, and that negotiations did oc-
cur.359 If a few additional facts relating to the conduct of those negotiations
350. Because neither access nor use existed, no contractual obligation to enforce existed. Id. at
477-78.
351. SeeA. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 161-62. In the absence of direct evidence of copying, the
plaintiff's proof of access and similarities gives rise to an inference of copying.
352. Mann 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 477.
353. The absence of an intent to copy is irrelevant in an infringement action-the result is the
determining factor. A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 160.
354. Cf. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489-90 (9th Cir.
1984) (an implied-in-fact contract for disclosure of an idea will be enforced only if circumstances
and conduct indicate the terms and existence of a contract prior to or simultaneous with the dis-
closure of the idea).
355. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rep'd and re-
manded, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
356. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 985-86 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd and
remanded, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
357. Id. at 985. The reported decisions in the Miller litigation make no reference to a contract
claim. The court directed a verdict for defendants on the issue of unfair competition and punitive
damages and the case went to the jury on the question of copyright infringement. See id.
358. Universal's producer offered $15,000; plaintiff Miller refused and asked for $200,000.
Universal then said it could go as high as $25,000, but no agreement was reached. Id at 985-96.
Miller's copyright claim, however, was credible; Universal had the book, and the book was relied
on heavily.
359. Id Sufficient evidence existed from which a jury reasonably could have concluded that
Universal had copied Miller's expression and not just his facts. See, e.g., id The court of appeals
in Miller reversed the verdict for Miller because of the trial court's erroneous instruction; the case
was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1376. The appellate court acknowledged that the record and
arguments revealed sufficient evidence to support a finding of infringement under principles of
copyright law. Id. at 1367.
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had been established, a court could have concluded that an implied-in-fact
contract existed, and that Universal therefore ought to pay Miller fair and
reasonable consideration for the movie rights. If the court found no copyright
infringement, plaintiff arguably should have received at least Universal's high-
est offer under the implied-in-fact contract claim. 360 Universal then would
have had to pay for what it had used and plaintiff would have been partially
compensated for his losses without contravening any copyright policies or the
preemptive thrust of section 301.
c. Quasi-contract and unjust enrichment
A nonfiction author also may recover on a quasi-contract or contract-im-
plied-in-law claim.361 Such an action, rather than being based on any express
or implied agreement, is based on notions of fundamental fairness and the
prevention of unjust enrichment. If the plaintiff recovers on such a claim, the
defendant must pay for the benefit he has received despite the absence of an
express contract.
362
This theory was successful in Werlin v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.
363
Plaintiff had written many newspaper and magazine articles, and for several
years had been encouraged by defendant's editors to submit articles and story
ideas. One of the articles she submitted, which previously had been published
in a local newspaper, concerned the Bar Mitzvah ceremony of a child with
Downs Syndrome. Defendant decided that plaintiff's article was written too
poorly to be published but thought that it contained "the kernel of a darn good
story." 364 The article was given to a Reader's Digest writer, who researched
the story himself and did not rely on plaintiff's article for any details. Defend-
ant published its own writer's story, never having rejected formally Werlin's
article. When plaintiff demanded a by-line, Reader's Digest offered her $250
for the idea.
365
Plaintiff sued Reader's Digest and alleged copyright infringement, misap-
propriation, and unjust enrichment. 366 The court stated that, for copyright
purposes, three components exist in such an article: an event, the idea that the
event would make a good story, and the author's expression of the story.
3 67
Because copyright protects only the author's expression of the story and not
360. See supra note 359.
361. Unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, contract implied-in-law, breach of a fiduciary or con-
fidential relationship, and a claim for equitable relief (in this situation) all name the same cause of
action.
362. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, TlE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-12 (2d ed. 1977); D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.2, at 234-35 (1973); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note
2, § 16.03. A plaintiff may join a quasi-contract claim with express and implied contract claims so
that the court may impose an obligation to pay even if the contract claims fail for lack of proof.
See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.03[B], at 16-16.
363. 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
364. Id. at 459.
365. Id at 454-59. The two articles were roughly the same length. Id at 458.
366. Id at 453-54; see also Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 363, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(similarly situated plaintiff filing similar actions).
367. Werlin, 528 F. Supp. at 461.
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the event or idea, and because defendant had not copied Werlin's expression,
the court held that plaintiff's copyright had not been infringed.368 The court
rejected plaintiff's misappropriation claim because neither a fiduciary nor con-
fidential relationship existed between the parties nor was there any evidence of
any bad faith, deception, or fraud. Furthermore, the court noted that defend-
ant's use of plaintiff's idea did not deprive plaintiff of any profit since she had
not submitted her article to any other publication.369
The court stated that "a contract will be implied in fact when the evidence
shows that the parties clearly intended payment to the extent of use of the
plaintiff's idea, though they did not set forth that intention in express lan-
guage."' 370 The court held, however, that no contract was implied under the
circumstances. 371 The court then concluded that, "[w]here the defendant has
benefitted from its use of an idea generated by the plaintiff, a court will allow
recovery in quasi contract if the circumstances make it inequitable for the de-
fendant to profit from the use of plaintiff's idea or material. ' 372 The court
stated that for plaintiff to recover in an unjust enrichment action under New
York law, she must prove that defendant was enriched by plaintiff, and that
under the circumstances it would be unjust in equity and good conscience to
permit defendant not to pay. Furthermore, to establish the element of enrich-
ment, plaintiff must demonstrate that her idea was novel, concrete, and actu-
ally appropriated by defendant in developing a work that defendant
published. 373 The court concluded that Werlin had established these ele-
ments, and that, given the years of encouragement by Reader's Digest, "[t]o
permit [Reader's Digest] to refuse to pay any compensation to Werlin would
be. . .to permit an injustice of the most fundamental sort."' 3 7 4
Werlin also held that the elements of a quasi-contract claim differ signifi-
cantly from those of copyright infringement, and that the quasi-contract claim
protects rights that differ qualitatively from those protected by copyright.
Thus, the court concluded that plaintiff's claim escaped preemption. 375 The
court also rejected defendant's argument that copyright was plaintiff's only
368. Id at 461-64.
369. Id at 464-65. The court did not consider whether the misappropriation claim was pre-
empted, perhaps because, under New York law, such a claim demands a showing that defendant
abused a confidential or fiduciary relationship to gain access to plaintiff's material. Id at 464,
Because this "abuse of a relationship" element is not part of an infringement claim, misappropria-
tion in jurisdictions requiring that element is not equivalent to copyright and therefore, should not
be preempted. 1 M. NIMMER, supranote 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-19 n.75.1. The court ignored the detri-
mental effect of the publication of Reader's Digest's story on plaintiff's possible future attempts to
market her story. See Werin 528 F. Supp. at 464-65.




374. Id at 466. Because plaintiff failed to raise the claim until after she had presented her
case, the court refused to allow her to submit evidence on the amount of unjust enrichment. The
court therefore awarded restitutionary damages of only $500, the amount that defendant customa-
rily paid to authors of articles that had been considered for publication and subsequently rejected.
Id. at 467.
375. Id at 467.
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means of redress because she had submitted a written article rather than an
idea. The court treated Werlin's work as both an article and an idea: to the
extent the work was an article, it enjoyed copyright protection; to the extent
the work was an idea, it enjoyed no copyright protection and only limited
state-law protection.
37 6
An unjust enrichment claim similar to the one asserted in Werlin may be
applicable to the protection of research. If plaintiff in Miller could have
demonstrated a relationship with Universal Studios similar to the relationship
between Reader's Digest and Werlin-encouragement to submit, submission
of the manuscript, and other facts giving rise to a quasi-contractual relation-
ship-he may have been able to recover on the basis of unjust enrichment.
377
It is not entirely clear, however, that an unjust enrichment claim is as qualita-
tively different from a copyright infringement claim as the Werlin court stated.
To establish that the enrichment is unjust, a plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant's use-ordinarily reproduction-was wrongful. The element of
wrongfulness is the only element of a quasi-contract claim that is not an ele-
ment of a copyright infringement claim. The wrongfulness element should not
be sufficient to distinguish a quasi-contract claim from copyright infringement,
and, therefore, the claim should be preempted.
378
Even if a quasi-contract action is equivalent to copyright, the Werlin
court's analytic distinction between plaintiff's article and her idea may be ap-
plied to save the claim from preemption under section 301. Under this analy-
sis, a nonfiction work enjoys copyright protection to the extent that it contains
copyrightable expression; to the extent that it contains unprotectible ideas,
facts, and research, it enjoys only limited state-law protection.379 Statutory
preemption would apply only to expression; an unjust enrichment claim could
protect research. Furthermore, since the quasi-contract remedy would apply
only when some relationship existed between the parties,380 enforcement of
376. Id The court distinguished the article from the topic on which it was written. See also
Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 366-67 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (claim for accounting because of
defendants' unjust enrichment from appropriating plaintiff's idea/creation withstood motion to
dismiss on preemption grounds because copyright protection extends only to expression and not to
the idea itself); infra notes 390-95 and accompanying text. But see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983) (even though portions of a work consist of
material not protectible by copyright, the work as a whole is not necessarily outside the subject
matter of copyright), cert. granted 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); supra notes 301-02 and
accompanying 
text.
377. Given Miller's negotiations with Universal over movie rights, such a claim would be
strong. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 985-86 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd and
remanded, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
378. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.0l[B], at 1-20 to -21, arguing that state-law causes of
action for unjust enrichment and quasi-contract should be regarded as equivalent to infringement
claims because their elements are identical to the elements of an infringement claim. But see
Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 945-46 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (to recover in
quantum meruit plaintiff must establish that defendant received valuable benefits, such as serv-
ices, under circumstances which would reasonably notify defendant that plaintiff expected to be
paid); infra notes 382-89 and accompanying text. Arguably, the Schuchart court articulated addi-
tional elements that make the claim not equivalent to an infringement claim.
379. See Werlin, 528 F. Supp. at 467. But see supra notes 291-302 and accompanying text.
Still, there are similarities with copyright as well as misappropriation.
380. See supra note 379; see also Rowe v. Golden West Televisions Productions, 184 N.J.
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the defendant's implied obligation to pay for benefits received would not inter-
fere significantly with copyright policies and should escape preemption under
Sears-Compeo.38 l
In Schuchart & Associates, Professional Engineers, Inc. v. Solo Serve
Corp.382 the court considered these issues and concluded that plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim escaped preemption. 383 Texas recognizes a right to recover
for unjust enrichment based on an implied-in-law promise to pay for services
rendered and knowingly accepted. To establish an unjust enrichment claim in
Schuchart, plaintiff had to prove that valuable services were rendered, or
materials furnished, to defendant. These services or materials had to have
been accepted and used by defendant under circumstances reasonably notify-
ing defendant that plaintiff, in performing the services, expected to be paid.
384
Defendants in Schuchart had accepted and used plaintiffs' architectural draw-
ings, and plaintiffs sought to recover the value of the architectural services
they had rendered to defendants. The court held that the rights asserted in this
unjust enrichment claim differed fundamentally from copyright: plaintiffs
were not trying to enforce their section 106 rights to control copying and distri-
bution of their works, but to recover for the value of services they had ren-
dered. Accordingly, section 301 did not preempt the unjust enrichment
action.38
5
The court next considered, under a Sears-Compco analysis, whether the
unjust enrichment claim clashed impermissibly with the objectives of the
copyright law.3 86 It noted that plaintiffs sought to recover the value of services
rendered, and thus, to the extent the state-law remedy promoted and protected
intellectual endeavors, its enforcement would not conflict with the copyright
policy of encouraging intellectual and artistic creation. The court acknowl-
edged, however, that copyright protects only expression,387 and that defend-
ants could not be prevented under state law from merely using architectural
Super. 264, 270 n.3, 445 A.2d 1165, 1167-68 n.3 (App. Div.) (New Jersey recognizes claim for
appropriation of an idea but only "in such circumstances that the law will imply a contractual or
fiduciary relationship .... " (quoting Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 107 N.J. Super. 311, 315, 258
A.2d 153, 156 (Law Div. 1969), aff'dper cur/am, 114 N.J. Super. 221, 275 A.2d 759 (App. Div.
1971))), cert. denied, 91 NJ. 241, 450 A.2d 562 (1982).
381. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 260-63 (1979); see supra notes 334-
36 and accompanying text.
382. 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
383. Id. at 948. Plaintiffs eventually prevailed in a later ruling on both the copyright infringe-
ment and unjust enrichment theories. Because defendants lost money on the project, however, the
court declined to award damages even though plaintiffs proved all necessary elements, Id. at 26
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 492 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
384. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 945.
385. Id The court also stated that plaintiffs were not seeking copyright damages by their
quantum meruit claim, but relief measured by the value of the services rendered-defendants
used the plans plaintiffs had prepared. Id
386. Id at 946-47. The court stated that "[i]n a line of cases beginning in 1964 [Sears and
Compco, for example], the Supreme Court has recognized an independent basis for preemption,"
Id. at 946.
387. Id at 948. For a discussion of the first amendment rationale for this dichotomy, see
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203-05 (2d Cir. 1983), cert,
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) (No. 83-1632); supra note 84.
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ideas or concepts identical to those in plaintiffs' drawings. Unjust enrichment,
however, could be used to protect plaintiffs' work if they could establish an
implied promise by defendants to pay for the beneficial services that plaintiffs
rendered and defendants knowingly accepted.388 Because plaintiffs could re-
cover only if the court determined that defendants accepted the plans and
were on reasonable notice that plaintiffs expected payment, plaintiffs' action
did not seek to prevent use of the ideas or concepts and the action was not
preempted.3
89
In Bromhall v. .Rorvik,390 defendant obtained plaintiff's nine-page ab-
stract of an unpublished doctoral thesis by claiming that he wanted assistance
for an article he was writing on research in the field of cell transplantation.
Instead, defendant wrote a purportedly factual book about experiments that
resulted in the creation of a human genetic "twin" through cloning, and cited
plaintiff several times in the bibliography.39 1 Plaintiff's defamation and com-
mon-law copyright counts were dismissed, 392 but his claim for equitable relief
withstood defendant's motion to dismiss. 393 Plaintiff alleged that after defend-
ant fraudulently obtained plaintiff's abstract, he appropriated the experimen-
tal cloning techniques described by plaintiff in the abstract. According to
plaintiff, this taking had enhanced the credibility and sales potential of de-
fendant's book; therefore defendant had been unjustly enriched. 394 The court
concluded that this count was not preempted because the rights the court as-
serted were not governed by the Copyright Act: "[clopyright protection ex-
tends only to expression of an idea, not the idea itself."
395
The success of the unjust enrichment claims in Werlin, Schuchart, and
Bromhall depended on whether the facts established a course of conduct or
dealings between the parties. This course-of-dealings requirement is not an
element of a copyright infringement action, and these unjust enrichment
claims therefore are not equivalent to copyright.396 Furthermore, if a distinc-
tion is made between protected expression and uncopyrightable ideas, facts,
and research, as in Werlin and Bromhall, an unjust enrichment action protects
388. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 948. The court analogized to the trade secret protection up-
held in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). Seesupranotes 210-16 and accom-
panying text. In Kewanee the Supreme Court held that the Ohio trade secret law could not be
used to prevent others from discovering plaintiff's secret method by reverse engineering, or from
then using that method in competition with plaintiffs, but it could be used against those who
obtained the method by unfair means. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 948.
389. Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. at 948. The court, however, granted summary judgment in favor
of one of the defendants on plaintiff's quantum meruit claim. Id
390. 478 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
391. Id. at 364-65.
392. Id at 365-66.
393. Id. at 366-67. Plaintiff alleged that the book was a hoax, and that it conveyed the false
impression that his research involved cloning humans. The common-law copyright count was
preempted by § 301 because the claim arose after January 1, 1978. Id at 366.
394. Id Plaintiff therefore sought an accounting.
395. Id. at 367 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 301(b)(1), (1982)).
396. Contra 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B], at 1-20 to -21 ("[i]t is submitted, however,
that this argument is circular").
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subject matter not protectible by copyright.397 Thus, such an unjust enrich-
ment claim should escape statutory preemption because the subject matter test
is not satisfied and because it is not an equivalent right.
If the state claim is protecting copyrightable subject matter, and no facts
have established a relationship between the parties, however, an unjust enrich-
ment claim is equivalent to a copyright infringement claim and should be pre-
empted under section 301.398 A plaintiff's allegations that the defendant had
access to and copied the plaintiff's materials, and thereby was enriched un-
justly, would be virtually identical to the elements of an infringement ac-
tion.3 99 If a relationship between the parties has not been established, and the
unjust enrichment claim protects facts not within the subject matter protected
by copyright, section 301 may not apply. Sears-Compco principles, however,
probably do require preemption. Otherwise, an author could prohibit anyone
from using the unprotectible facts embodied in his work on an unjust enrich-
ment theory, regardless of the existence of prior dealings; he would have a
monopoly on materials that are deemed to be in the public domain that would




The author of a nonfiction work faces serious difficulties in preventing the
unauthorized use of his research. Although the United States Court of Ap-
397. But cf. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 199-201 ("[t]he fact that portions of the [work] may
consist of uncopyrightable material,. . . does not take the work as a whole outside the subject
matter protected by the [Copyright] Act"). See supra note 319.
398. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.0l[B], at 1-20 to -21.
399. The claim in that context would be little different than the conversion and tortious inter-
ference with contract claims preempted in Harper & Row. The court of appeals in Harper & flow
first determined that § 301's subject matter test was satisfied, id at 199-201, and then analyzed
whether plaintiff's state-law claims were equivalent. Id at 201. The court noted that plaintiffs
faced a serious dilemma with respect to their conversion claims: If the gravamen of the claims was
unauthorized publication, then the claim was preempted as coextensive with rights protected by
the Copyright Act-namely, the control over reproduction and derivative uses of copyrighted ma-
terial. Id Alternatively, if the foundation of the claims was defendant's unauthorized possession
and control of the work, then it would not be preempted since these acts were qualitatively differ-
ent from those proscribed by copyright. This alternative approach to conversion failed, however,
because defendant's acts were not a sufficient interference with plaintiff's property rights to
demonstrate conversion. Id. The court regarded tortious interference with contract as equivalent
to a violation of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work,
and held that defendant's acts had destroyed plaintiffs' control over prepublication serialization
rights. Id. It is important to note that the court of appeals' discussion of conversion demonstrates
that in some instances conversion is not equivalent-the acts of possession and control of literary
works are qualitatively different from the acts proscribed by copyright. This remedy, however, is
not appropriate for an author or researcher unless he can demonstrate that defendant is exercising
unauthorized dominion and control over the chattel (manuscript) to his complete exclusion. See
id at 201 & n.5. Thus, the plaintiff must prove a substantial interference with his property rights,
and none of the cases discussed herein dealing with appropriations of research involved such
misconduct.
400. Id at 200-01, 203-05. State-law remedies protecting an author's research cannot run
against the world. Even if § 301 did not apply to the plaintiffs' conversion and tortious interfer-
ence with contract claims because the materials converted were not copyrightable, enforcement of
these state-law claims would have prohibited defendant from using public domain materials,
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peals for the Seventh Circuit in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co. arguably ex-
tended copyright protection by requiring a second author to conduct
independent research, such an extension is inconsistent with the principle that
copyright protects expression and not facts. Thus, some courts have rejected
the expansive holding in Toksvig and have allowed unlimited use of facts
found in nonfiction works. Because these courts are unwilling to extend copy-
right protection to research, an author in these jurisdictions must rely on com-
mon-law remedies if he cannot prove copying of protected expression.
The most advantageous common-law alternative to copyright is misap-
propriation. If the materials at issue are within the subject matter of copy-
right, however, the Copyright Act's broad preemptive reach limits the
application of the doctrine to situations in which there is a pattern of miscon-
duct. Even if section 102(b) of the Copyright Act is interpreted to permit state-
law protection of facts and research so that section 301 of the Act would not
apply, a misappropriation claim nevertheless should be preempted under the
Sears-Compco principles. Therefore, state-law protection of research is re-
stricted to cases in which a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship has
been breached. Except in these limited circumstances, a nonfiction author is
not able to protect his research. To protect research in other situations would
contravene the strong federal policy that facts are not the property of any
individual.
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